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M E L I S S A  J .  D U R K E E  
International Lobbying Law 
abstract.  An idiosyncratic array of international rules allows “consultants” to gain special 
access to international officials and lawmakers. Historically, many of these consultants were pub-
lic-interest associations like Amnesty International. For this reason, the access rules have been cel-
ebrated as a way to democratize international organizations, enhancing their legitimacy and that 
of the rules they produce. But a focus on the classic public-law virtues of democracy and legitimacy 
produces a theory at odds with the facts: Many of these international consultants are now industry 
and trade associations like the World Coal Association, whose principal purpose is to lobby for 
their corporate clients. The presence of these corporate lobbyists challenges the conventional view, 
which I call strong legitimacy optimism, by focusing a set of longstanding critiques: Consultant 
associations are not always representatives of the “global public” and consultation is not robust 
participation in governance. Moreover, the access rules both overregulate and underregulate access 
to lawmakers. This critique is particularly salient in the context of business lobbying, where the 
access rules do not balance the costs and beneﬁts of business access to international lawmaking 
and governance. 
 This Article introduces a theory of international lobbying law. Reframing the international 
access rules as a body of lobbying regulations delivers explanatory and normative payoffs by iden-
tifying (1) the full array of actors who obtain access (public interest and private sector alike); (2) 
the quantum of access that the current system delivers (informal lobbying, not participation in 
governance); and (3) new regulatory strategies. Speciﬁcally, two regulatory models emerge. One 
draws on the ﬂawed but best-available registration and disclosure norms of domestic lobbying 
regulation. The other is a multistakeholder model pioneered by twenty-ﬁrst-century public-pri-
vate partnership organizations. The Article develops an original typology to organize and identify 
features of the international access rules across diverse international organizations, thereby clari-
fying the regulatory tradeoffs that accompany each choice. Perhaps counterintuitively, reformers 
should likely eschew the most common middle-of-the-road access models—which are grounded 
in the ﬂawed legitimacy optimism view—and instead choose among the two divergent regulatory 
models, with that choice driven by organizational mission. 
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introduction 
In national jurisdictions like the United States, laws governing lobbying ac-
tivity are well developed
1
 and subject to robust analysis and critique.
2
 Interna-
tionally, however, the regulatory environment for lobbying activity is highly id-
iosyncratic and undertheorized. In fact, legal rules that govern lobbying activity 
at the international level have not yet been recognized as a body of lobbying law. 
Rather, the patchwork of legal regimes is cast as a variety of “consultation” rules
3
 
that allow individuals and groups to “democratize” international institutions by 
offering to lawmakers and policymakers the diverse perspectives of a global pol-
ity.
4
 This input is said to be a “basic form of popular representation in the pre-
sent-day world” and “a guarantee of . . . political legitimacy.”
5
 I call this conven-
tional account “strong legitimacy optimism.” 
 
1. For a history of U.S. federal lobbying laws, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Reg-
ulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5 (William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 
4th ed. 2009); and Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure 
Reform Proposals Since 1955, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra, at 23. 
2. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobby-
ing, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 87-90 (2014) 
(proposing reforms that would subsidize lobbying activity by public-interest groups); Rich-
ard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 216 (2012) 
(proposing a “national economic welfare” rationale for lobbying regulation); Samuel Issa-
charoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010) (reviewing efforts to redress 
the “ﬁnancial vulnerabilities of democracy”); Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition 
Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1199 (2016) (asserting that current lobbying regulation and 
practice violates the First Amendment’s Petition Clause); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law 
of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 6 (2014) (noting that the scope of the constitutional lobbying 
right is unclear). 
3. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrange-
ments for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with mat-
ters within its competence.”); Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996) 
(making “arrangements for consultation” with NGOs). Following common usage in the lit-
erature, here “consultation” is used to refer to access to international institutions by nonstate 
actors and “consultants” to those actors who gain such access. This follows the usage intro-
duced in Article 71 of the Charter. Of course, “consultants” in this international context are 
not contracted, employed, or compensated for their services. 
4. See, e.g., We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Rep. of 
the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Soc’y Relations, U.N. Doc. A/58/817, 
at 3 (June 11, 2004) [hereinafter Cardoso Report] (“The growing participation and inﬂuence 
of non-State actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism.”). 
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. Sec’y-Gen., Keynote Address by Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali to the 47th DPI/NGO Conference (Sept. 8, 1994), in 47th Annual DPI/NGO 
Conference, We the Peoples: Building Peace, at 3 (Sept. 8, 1994). 
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The lofty goals of this conventional account belie the quotidian reality of in-
ternational lobbying. The truth is that the rules vary from institution to institu-
tion, with frameworks that appear to be driven principally by historical accident, 
rather than coherent theory or principled design. Many of the international “con-
sultants” are now industry and trade lobbyist associations like the World Coal 
Association. These associations play a two-level game, lobbying both national 
and international officials.
6
 They are neither democratic representatives of a 
mythical “global public,” nor are they offered the meaningful quantum of access 
that the strong legitimacy optimist model suggests. Yet private-sector actors can 
possess valuable expertise and innovative perspectives that are sometimes sup-
pressed by obsolete access rules or drowned out in the melee of an unstructured 
process. 
Thus, the facts show that the strong legitimacy optimist theory is descrip-
tively ﬂawed and normatively limited. The result, as this Article argues, is a set 
of legal regimes at the international level that both under- and overregulate in-
ternational lobbying activities. On the one hand, these regimes can sacriﬁce 
transparency, administrability, or effectiveness; on the other hand, they can un-
necessarily expose international officials and lawmakers to capture.
7
 This mat-
ters to both international and national law, as international legal rules can be 
implemented within national jurisdictions and shape choices by domestic regu-
lators.
8
 In contemporary parlance, when it comes to regulating global business 
lobbying, there is plenty of room to make “[e]verything that’s working . . . bet-
ter,” to ﬁx what is not working, and to do away with obsolete rules.
9
 
The Article develops a theory of international lobbying law. The theory be-
gins with a critique, challenging the well-established but mistaken assumption 
in international law that consultation with nonstate actors is, as a formal matter, 
 
6. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 
42 INT’L ORGS. 427 (1988) (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national leaders reﬂects 
the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games). 
7. See infra Section II.A, Part IV. 
8. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 497-500 (2005) (observing that “much of international law is obeyed 
primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for ensuring that a state abides by 
its international legal commitments”); see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of 
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 170 (1999) (conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent 
of small interest groups); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 539 (2004) (“Governments may form treaties for many of the same rea-
sons that they enact statutes—to achieve domestic goals.”). 
9. Somini Sengupta, Nikki Haley Puts U.N. on Notice: U.S. Is ‘Taking Names,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/world/americas/nikki-haley-united-nations
.html [http://perma.cc/7HDM-ZX38] (“Everything that’s working we’re going to make it 
better. Everything that’s not working we’re going to try and ﬁx. And anything that seems to 
be obsolete and not necessary we’re going to do away with.” (quoting Ambassador Haley)). 
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a means of democratizing international institutions. While the strong form of 
this theory has fallen out of vogue in the legal scholarship, it still serves as the 
theoretical foundation on which many of the access structures in international 
organizations were built. The critique this Article develops is that strong legiti-
macy optimism is both descriptively inaccurate and unhelpful as a reform prin-
ciple. In short, it obstructs (1) regulation that would prevent undue inﬂuence 
and capture, as well as (2) development of multistakeholder institutions that 
would incorporate meaningful private-sector input. 
The lobbying framework offered in this Article better describes the actors 
involved (diverse, often corporate); reﬂects the kinds of access that the rules af-
ford (limited); and offers promising regulatory responses borrowed from na-
tional lobbying theory and jurisprudence, such as registration and disclosure. At 
the same time, by illustrating that international lobbying access is currently quite 
limited in scope, the theory also invites lawmakers to develop new non-lobbying 
structures when those structures would better suit institutional purposes. Thus, 
the lobbying theory facilitates more coherent regulation of lobbying activity, 
and, at the same time, reveals the need for truly participatory public-private part-
nership structures when those will better respond to pressing global problems. 
Finally, the Article maps these payoffs onto an original typology that organizes 
lobbying rules across a diverse set of international institutions. 
The Article thus contributes to, and simultaneously attempts to reframe, the 
growing literature on the participation of nonstate actors in shaping the devel-
opment of international law.
10
 In particular, this project contributes to incipient 
 
10. A ﬁrst literature, arising principally out of international relations, focuses on how nonstate 
actors lobby at the national government level, thereby shaping a nation’s international prefer-
ences. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Interna-
tional Politics, 51 INT’L ORGS. 513 (1997) (elaborating liberal theory in international relations 
and explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests). Other accounts have 
noted nonstate actor contributions to governance occurring beyond the state. See, e.g., PAUL 
SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 
(2012) (developing a theory of global legal pluralism); KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD 
ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013) (developing a theory of democratic policy diffusion); ANNE-MA-
RIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005) (conceptualizing this activity as trans-govern-
mental networks); Gráinne De Búrca et al., Global Experimentalist Governance, 44 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 477 (2014) (developing a theory of “experimentalist” governance); Terence C. Halliday 
& Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terence 
C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) (developing a theory of transnational legal orders). 
This project is situated in the context of a third literature, which notes nonstate contributions 
to governance through international institutions. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) [hereinafter THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW] (studying nonstate actor contribu-
tions to formal law); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 
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literatures that seek to understand the ways one inﬂuential kind of nonstate ac-
tor—the business entity—is involved in the formal processes of intergovernmen-
tal development of law and policy.
11
 Notable contributions in this arena analyze 
business lobbying in the context of individual treaties—such as climate treaties—
and the adoption of private standards into public agreements.
12
 However, the 
literature that evaluates nonstate participation in lawmaking under the auspices 
of “consultation” at international institutions has principally focused on 
 
(2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS] (same); Kenneth W. 
Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International Institutions, 8 J. INT’L L. & 
INT’L REL. 1 (2012) (conceptualizing this activity as taking place through multistakeholder 
structures); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deﬁcit, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009) (conceptualizing this activity as cooperative public-private mech-
anisms and projects); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15 (conceptualizing this activity as ad-
ministrative action). 
11. See Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
147, 150 (2009) (proposing this area of research); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International 
Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1601 (2011) (noting a lack of information about the degree and 
effect of corporate participation in international lawmaking). There are a number of more 
robust contributions in political science, international relations, and sociology. See, e.g., JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000) (sociology); THE 
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (political sci-
ence); PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999) 
(international relations). 
12. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (reviewing delegation of regulatory power to 
international private-sector standard-setting organizations); Markus Wagner, Regulatory 
Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 56-58 
(2014) (describing a mechanism whereby the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement 
incorporates privately created international standards); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, 
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 548-50 (2005) (describing 
the entrenchment of international regulatory standardization through bureaucratic coopera-
tion). A separate robust literature responds to institutionalized efforts to engage the business 
sector through the Global Compact, the Ruggie Principles, and a potential Business and Hu-
man Rights treaty. See generally Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275 
(2017) (reviewing this literature). 
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NGOs,
13
 and downplayed or underrecognized any business presence in this 
group.
14
 
Here, I show that business involvement as “consultants” or “observers” in 
institutions across the UN is a broad phenomenon.
15
 It is also an area that is 
currently facing a signiﬁcant degree of controversy and change, as exempliﬁed 
by reform proposals recently lodged at the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).
16
 
The reform proposals respond to the ambivalent nature of business contribu-
tions. On the one hand, welcoming and facilitating business input is essential in 
many instances, when business entities offer expertise, develop technical stand-
ards, facilitate politically neutral solutions, offer funding for important global 
projects, or serve as essential stakeholders whose acceptance will be necessary to 
a rule’s success. On the other hand, fears of undue business inﬂuence, capture, 
and other forms of subversion of regulatory processes are justiﬁed when proﬁt-
seeking motives conﬂict with public regulatory agendas. Perhaps as a result of 
that essential ambivalence, there is no consistent regulatory response to business 
lobbying across international institutions, either within or outside of the UN. 
The current international legal context is further muddied by the instability 
of settled law and institutions, as exempliﬁed by unfolding phenomena like 
 
13. For representative discussions, see, for example, Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legit-
imacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
841, 846, 890 (2011) (arguing that NGOs serve as their own gatekeepers and confer legitimacy 
on themselves); David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2010) 
(advocating for more NGO participation in lawmaking); and Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or 
the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2000) (contending that “[p]ar-
ticipation by non-State actors in the international legal system greatly enhances [the] account-
ability [of the international legal system]”). For reviews of the literature, see Steve Char-
novitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 365–66 
(2006); and Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 161 n.2 (2002) (“Re-
ﬂecting the rise of non-state actors, the academic and policy literature on NGOs has itself 
exploded.”). 
14. See Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017) (noting that a literature 
regarding the role of businesses in lobbying through accreditation at international institutions 
has not yet matured and making an initial foray into this topic). 
15. See infra Section I.A for a preliminary discussion and Part IV for a more fulsome treatment. 
16. See U.N. Director-General, Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, World Health 
Org. [WHO], U.N. Doc. A69/6 (May 18, 2016) (providing a draft framework with alternative 
provisions proposed by state parties); Claire R. Kelly, The Politics of Legitimacy in the UN-
CITRAL Working Methods, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 106, 119 
(Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011). The WHO’s framework was ﬁnalized on May 28, 2016. 
World Health Org., Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, WHA69.10 (May 28, 
2016) [hereinafter WHO, Framework]. 
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Brexit,
17
 the threat of African withdrawals from the International Criminal 
Court,
18
 and announcements by the current U.S. executive and other populist 
leaders of bold reformist agendas that include proposals to exit major interna-
tional agreements.
19
 The potential retreat from globalism challenges the post-
World War II consensus, and a rise of geopolitical multipolarity threatens to dis-
rupt the success of hallowed international institutions.
20
 But uncertainty and 
change also present opportunities to reconsider key features of the current order. 
How do nonstate actors participate in the process of international lawmaking, 
and how should they? What is the theory that justiﬁes opening or closing the 
doors to these actors? What structures might best regulate nonstate participa-
tion, and, in particular, business lobbying? This Article offers a theory capable 
of producing new answers to these questions. It focuses reforms on developing 
the means to capture important informational and practical contributions of all 
nonstate participants—whether they are classic public-interest NGOs, industry 
or trade associations, business entities, or others—while restraining the risk of 
capture. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II review the structure of the 
access rules and existing scholarly accounts of them, highlighting a persistent 
dilemma about whether, and if so to what extent, nonstate actor participation 
contributes to the legitimacy or democratization of international organizations 
and the rules they produce. The argument of Part I is that the conventional, 
though contested, “legitimacy optimist” position is evident in the structure of 
the access rules themselves, as this theory has guided reforms over time. Part II 
then develops a critique of that conventional theory by showing that business 
use of these access rules through trade or industry associations is a signiﬁcant—
 
17. See, e.g., Phuong Tran, Brexit: How A Weakened European Union Affects NAFTA, 22 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 281, 282 (2016). 
18. See, e.g., Michael Plachta, 28th Summit of the African Union Backs Collective Withdrawal from 
the International Criminal Court, 33 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 80 (2017). 
19. See Karen Alter, The Future of International Law 9 (Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 17-18, 
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3015177 [http://perma.cc/8952-MM2X] (noting Donald 
Trump’s “insist[ence] that the United States will neither lead nor necessarily honor its com-
mitments” among other forms of backlash against the international liberal order). 
20. See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, Why the New Nationalists are Taking Over, POLITICO (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/nationalism-donald-trump-boris 
-johnson-brexit-foreign-policy-xenophobia-isolationism-213995 [http://perma.cc/YN2G 
-DWJC]; League of Nationalists, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.economist.com
/news/international/21710276-all-around-world-nationalists-are-gaining-ground-why 
-league-nationalists [http://perma.cc/P5YY-GP5E]; The Liberal Order of the Past 70 Years is 
Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts
/21729415-it-was-underpinned-movement-make-waging-aggressive-war-illegal-and 
[http://perma.cc/P9RH-YE9F] (reviewing OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE IN-
TERNATIONALISTS (2017)). 
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but underappreciated and undertheorized—feature of transnational business ac-
tivity. The argument is not that this business activity is necessarily problematic, 
but rather that the strong legitimacy optimist theory and existing access rules do 
not adequately respond to potential risks. 
In Part III, the Article offers a theory of international lobbying law and as-
serts that, as a descriptive theory, it better describes the nature of the access that 
lobbying rules afford (not voting, not representative), and the actors who engage 
in that lobbying activity (industry and trade associations as well as public-inter-
est NGOs and others). As a prescriptive theory, it offers a productive analogy to 
domestic lobbying law, which focuses on the beneﬁts nonstate actors can offer 
lawmakers, and rules that are responsive to potential ills, with reporting and 
transparency safeguards that cast sunlight on the lobbying process. 
Finally, Part IV offers a typology that organizes lobbying rules along two di-
mensions: (1) the degree of inﬂuence nonstate actors can exercise within the reg-
ulatory or legislative process, and (2) the degree to which the rules classify actors 
or groups and offer varied levels of access to each. The typology facilitates anal-
ysis of the array of existing access rules at diverse international organizations 
within the Article’s international lobbying frame. It crystallizes regulatory 
tradeoffs and potential reforms. In short, reframing “consultation” rules as in-
ternational lobbying law should facilitate reform of outdated and undertheorized 
rules that threaten the effectiveness of important international institutions. At 
the same time, clarifying the limitations of lobbying should help pave the way 
for more transformative participatory structures. 
*** 
Before proceeding, one clariﬁcation is in order. The term “lobbying” is 
fraught. It is not the argument of this Article that international access regimes 
are plagued by inappropriate inﬂuences. Nor is the point to denigrate the valua-
ble input that public-interest and private-sector groups can offer to the interna-
tional law- and policy-making process. Rather, the theory and practice of lobby-
ing regulation offers a useful model to understand and govern public 
participation in lawmaking in the international context. 
Indeed, this Article’s analysis unearths a strange contrast. On the one hand, 
international commentators have expressed an outsized optimism about the po-
tential of international access structures to improve governance: to enhance the 
transparency of international organizations, to legitimize or democratize them, 
or to offer them the perspectives of underrepresented groups. On the other hand, 
observers of lobbying regulation in the U.S. and elsewhere seem to express an 
unwarranted cynicism about the law and practice of lobbying. The following 
analysis suggests that both reactions may be too extreme. 
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i .  the international access rules 
The rules by which nonstate actors gain access to international lawmakers 
and officials do not ﬂow from a single origin. That is, there is no treaty or other 
uniﬁed source of law that prescribes how and when international organizations 
should offer access to the public. There is no international Administrative Pro-
cedure Act to require a notice-and-comment process, or constitutional speech or 
petition rights to protect access. Rather, the legal authority for each international 
organization to permit nonstate access—to the extent that such authority ex-
ists—usually originates in the treaty or other foundational document that serves 
as the organization’s charter. International organizations implement those char-
ter provisions by developing access rules. Those rules are analogous to the pro-
cedural rules and standards that administrative agencies in national govern-
ments apply to regulate access. Because these charter provisions and their 
resultant regulatory rules differ across international organizations, the result is a 
patchwork of rules that vary from institution to institution.
21
 Perhaps it is be-
cause of this diversity and heterogeneity that no previous legal analysis has ex-
amined these rules as a single body of lobbying law,
22
 or organized them within 
a single theoretical framework.
23
 
Nevertheless, there is a clear starting point for such an analysis. Many of 
these rules follow a template established by the United Nations’ Economic and 
 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. To be clear, NGO access to international lawmakers has been the subject of sustained interest 
and analysis in law and political science, with great attention paid especially to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) structure with which I begin this Article, 
and consultation structures for environmental treaties like the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). But these accounts do not conceive of these rules as a body of 
international lobbying law. For a selection of leading accounts, see INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 10; PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
supra note 11; SLAUGHTER, supra note 10; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 501; Anderson, 
supra note 13; Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Steve Charnovitz, Two 
Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183 (1997); 
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 
YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Gartner, supra note 13; Kingsbury et al., supra note 10; Kal Raustiala, 
The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 
(1997); Peter J. Spiro, Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
23. See infra Part IV for the organizational framework this Article offers. 
the yale law journal 127:1742  2018 
1754 
Social Council (ECOSOC), which has implemented rules pursuant to a statu-
tory mandate in the UN Charter.
24
 This Part introduces those ECOSOC rules, 
identiﬁes the strong legitimacy optimist theory, and demonstrates how that con-
ventional theory has become embedded as a normative principle into the access 
rules themselves. In doing so, the Part lays a foundation for the critique to come. 
A. Introducing the Access Rules 
The ECOSOC accreditation system offers a seminal example of how inter-
national access rules work. The ECOSOC regulatory structure is important be-
cause it was developed early in the life of the UN and thus has inspired path 
dependence among other international access structures, serving as a blueprint 
for many of them.
25
 It also functions as a gatekeeper for a number of interna-
tional organizations within the UN system.
26
 That is, to gain access to these lat-
ter organizations, an association must ﬁrst obtain access to ECOSOC. 
The ECOSOC access rules are authorized by the UN Charter. Article 71 of 
the Charter empowers ECOSOC to “make suitable arrangements for consulta-
tion with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters 
within its competence.”
27
 The negotiating history of this provision is illuminat-
ing. About twelve hundred NGO representatives were present in San Francisco 
for the signing of the NGO charter at the end of World War II.
28
 Some of these 
NGOs were invited consultants to national delegations, and others simply trav-
eled to the conference to see if they could persuade the delegates to adopt their 
agendas.
29
 One of these agendas was to obtain a formal status within the new 
United Nations.
30
 During the League of Nations era, before World War II, 
NGOs had worked closely and cooperatively with the League in many aspects of 
 
24. U.N. Charter art. 71. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See id. 
27. U.N. Charter art. 71. 
28. Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 251. 
29. See Bill Seary, The Early History: From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco Conference, in 
‘THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD’: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
IN THE UN SYSTEM 15, 25-26 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996). 
30. See Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 251 (reporting that an NGO consultant sought “a provision 
on NGOs in the U.N. Charter,” an idea that had not been previously considered by state del-
egates at the Dumbarton Oaks conference); see also Seary, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that 
“the US government gave in to pressure from the NGO consultants and accepted the idea” 
that NGOs should have an official role in ECOSOC). 
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its work in what was dubbed at the time the “League Method” of interaction.
31
 
That League Method was an informal practice rather than a statutorily sanc-
tioned relationship, so NGOs sought to have this practice formalized, and per-
haps even expanded, under the new UN Charter.
32
 
The San Francisco NGO lobbyists partly succeeded in that the UN Charter 
contained the Article 71 provision authorizing ECOSOC to “consult” with 
NGOs.
33
 But in a larger sense, the NGOs were unsuccessful in that this provision 
formalized a clearly subordinate role for NGOs in comparison with international 
organizations and nation-states. NGOs did not attain any voting privileges, 
rights to participate in treaty drafting, or any other formal participatory rights. 
The term “consultation” is not deﬁned in the Charter and so the nature of the 
relationship—and indeed, whether ECOSOC formed such consultative relation-
ships at all—was purely at ECOSOC’s discretion. The UN Charter also failed to 
formalize relationships between NGOs and any other organ of the UN besides 
ECOSOC, like the General Assembly or the Security Council.
34
 
Empowered by Article 71, ECOSOC has adopted a set of regulations enabling 
NGOs to apply to become accredited “for consultation with” the Council.
35
 In 
the Council’s conception, consultative status serves dual purposes: to assist the 
UN in gathering relevant expertise from nongovernmental sources and to give 
members of civil society the opportunity to have access to governance functions 
 
31. See Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 221-237, 245-46 (describing the League-era context in which 
voluntary associations deﬁned and presented issues for the League’s consideration; served as 
“insiders working directly with government officials and international civil servants to ad-
dress” international problems, principally through policy conferences; and lobbied those in 
power). Indeed, voluntary, issue-oriented associations became active in inﬂuencing interna-
tional law much before the League period, “emerg[ing] at the end of the eighteenth century 
and bec[oming] international by 1850. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a pat-
tern of private international cooperation evolving into public international action . . . . Behind 
many [early international organizations] stood idealistic and active NGOs.” Id. at 212. 
32. Id. at 251. 
33. U.N. Charter art. 71. 
34. See generally U.N. Charter (referring to NGOs only in Article 71). 
35. The Council has passed various resolutions to govern NGO access to the UN pursuant to 
Article 71. Economic and Social Council Res. 43 (June 21, 1946) (making arrangements for 
consultation with NGOs); Economic and Social Council Res. 288 (X) (Feb. 27, 1950) (codi-
fying privileges and practices relating to NGOs that had developed between 1946 and 1950); 
Economic and Social Council Res. 1296 (XLIV) (May 23, 1968); Economic and Social Council 
Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (offering an updated set of rules that remain in effect as of this 
writing). For narrative descriptions of the role of these resolutions, see 2 THE CHARTER OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1797 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); and THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 904-05 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1st ed. 
1994). 
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and to express their opinions.
36
 ECOSOC has updated the regulations several 
times in an attempt to better serve these dual purposes and respond to perceived 
deﬁcits.
37
 The rules currently in force were last updated in 1996.
38
 
The 1996 rules contain a variety of criteria that focus on how well an NGO 
seeking access represents its members, and whether it has internal governance 
mechanisms that make its representatives accountable to that membership. As a 
preliminary manner, the association must have “aims and purposes” that support 
“the spirit, purposes and principles” of the UN and “promote” the UN’s work.
39
 
It must be able to establish the accountability and representativeness of its inter-
nal governance mechanisms through indicia such as “an established headquar-
ters”;
40
 “a democratically adopted constitution” providing for a representative 
process to set policy;
41
 a responsive “executive organ”;
42
 and documented “au-
thority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives.”
43
 Or-
ganizations must be nonproﬁts and obtain their funding from “national affili-
ate[] [organizations] . . . or from individual members.”
44
 Finally, the 
organization must represent its particular ﬁeld by “be[ing] of recognized stand-
ing within the particular ﬁeld of its competence or of a representative charac-
ter.”
45
 
The menu of privileges offered to accredited associations includes access to 
information, opportunities to submit oral and written comments, and informal 
lobbying opportunities. For example, accredited organizations may obtain UN 
 
36. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 20 (“[C]onsultative arrange-
ments are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its 
bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations . . . and, on the other hand, 
to enable international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent im-
portant elements of public opinion to express their views.”).  
37. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
38. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3. 
39. See id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
40. Id. ¶ 10. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. ¶ 11. Resolution 1996/31 also includes a repetitive catchall provision: the organization must 
possess “a representative structure and . . . appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its 
members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise 
of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes.” 
Id. ¶ 12. 
44. Id. ¶ 13. There is a loophole: when an organization is ﬁnanced from other sources, it must 
explain to the satisfaction of the Council (via its Committee on NGOs) the organization’s 
reasons for not meeting these requirements. Id. 
45. See id. ¶ 9. 
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“grounds passes” and admission to UN-sponsored treaty-making conferences, 
both of which offer opportunities for informal dialogue with national delegates 
and international officials.
46
 They may also send representatives to sit as observ-
ers at meetings of ECOSOC, its commissions, and other subsidiary bodies; pre-
sent written or oral comments to international officials; receive meeting agen-
das; and propose agenda items.
47
 Organizations are accredited in three different 
tiers, obtaining access and lobbying privileges that correspond to the organiza-
tion’s tier. “General” consultants are offered the broadest range of access privi-
leges, while “special” and “roster” organizations receive fewer.
48
 
The ECOSOC framework has been replicated around the UN system, with 
other agencies adopting similar access regulations. A few organizations have a 
parallel Article 71 in their organizational charters, authorizing a consultation sys-
tem for those organizations in the same way as the UN Charter authorizes one 
for ECOSOC.
49
 Many, like ECOSOC, will minimally screen organizations in an 
initial accreditation procedure; a number will divide associations into rough cat-
egories that correspond to the association’s breadth and depth of expertise across 
relevant subject areas and afford tailored access privileges to each, as does 
ECOSOC. However, ECOSOC’s model is by no means the only way for interna-
tional institutions to incorporate outside input. Another method, which has been 
embraced by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is to 
 
46. See Accreditation, UNITED NATIONS OFF. GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/ngo/accreditation 
[http://perma.cc/Y95U-BUMA]. 
47. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶¶ 27-30, 32(a). 
48. Id. ¶¶ 21–26; see also STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 66 
(2007) (reviewing the tiered consultation structure); Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 267 (same). 
“General” status is reserved for organizations that are the most global in footprint and pursue 
the broadest missions: they “are concerned with most of [ECOSOC’s] activities”; “can 
demonstrate . . . sustained contributions . . . to the achievement of [UN] objectives”; and are 
“broadly representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries.” Eco-
nomic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 22; see also Kal Raustiala, NGOs in 
International Treaty-Making, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 150, 156 n.24 (Duncan B. 
Hollis ed., 2012) (noting that NGOs with general status “tend to be fairly large, established 
international NGOs with a broad geographical reach”). “Special” status is for organizations 
that are concerned with “a few of the ﬁelds of activity” the Council pursues. Economic and 
Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 23; see also Raustiala, supra, at 156 n.24 (stating 
that NGOs with Special consultative status “tend to be smaller and more recently estab-
lished”). Finally, “Roster” status falls short of full consultancy status and is granted to NGOs 
that do not qualify for the other two categories but may make “occasional and useful contri-
butions” to the UN’s work. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶ 24; see 
also Raustiala, supra, at 157 n.24 (“Organizations that apply for consultative status but do not 
ﬁt in any of the other categories are usually included in the Roster. These NGOs tend to have 
a rather narrow and/or technical focus.”). 
49. See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 71, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 
14 U.N.T.S. 185. 
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solicit input from particular associations at particular decision points, rather than 
maintaining a standing bench of consultants. Other, more innovative institu-
tions, like the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Women, and the 
GAVI Alliance, offer full membership—and even voting rights—to nonstate ac-
tors. UNCITRAL demonstrates another unique model, allowing consultants to 
participate in a consensus decision-making procedure, thereby affording robust 
participatory rights to nonstate actors, even though it does not offer full mem-
bership to those entities. These variations are explored in greater length in Part 
IV. This preliminary introduction of the ECOSOC rules is offered not to serve 
as a full analysis of those rules but to lay a foundation for the theory and critique 
that follows. 
B. Theorizing the Rules 
Can consultation “democratize” international organizations, bolstering their 
authority to undertake global governance? The question has been the subject of 
robust debates in law and political science, and it has signiﬁcant practical conse-
quences. If the answer is yes—the access rules can enhance an organization’s 
democratic legitimacy—then international organizations can potentially claim 
broader authority than that delegated by national governments. The conse-
quences of this position are particularly sensitive in a political milieu like that 
which exists at the time of this writing—an era of nationalist retraction, growing 
multipolarity, and skepticism of the broadly claimed authority of multilateral in-
stitutions. Moreover, the answer to the descriptive question brings normative 
consequences. If input from nonstate entities is legitimizing and democratizing, 
then access rules should likely attend to the representativeness and accountabil-
ity of the entities that offer that input. If, on the other hand, input from NGOs 
cannot confer on international organizations additional authority or legitimacy, 
then regulation of nonstate access is susceptible to a different, more pluralistic 
and pragmatic, set of reforms. 
The following sections divide this question into its descriptive and normative 
aspects, and review each debate in turn. 
1. The Descriptive Dimension: Can Consultation Confer Legitimacy? 
The ﬁrst debate is descriptive: can consultation confer on international or-
ganizations additional legitimacy or a broader democratic mandate than those 
organizations would have without it? There are three responses to this question: 
legitimacy optimism in strong and moderate forms, and legitimacy pessimism. 
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a. Strong Legitimacy Optimism  
The strong legitimacy optimist view asserts that nonstate actor input 
through the access rules can indeed contribute to the legitimacy of international 
legal rules.
50
 This contribution is thought to be particularly valuable because in-
ternational organizations struggle with legitimacy deﬁcits.
51
 The argument is 
that international organizations lack “democratic legitimacy” because they can-
not be held accountable through the ballot box.
52
 Indeed, they could not be dem-
ocratically accountable unless there was some sort of global parliamentary sys-
tem.
53
 Rather, international organizations derive their legitimacy derivatively, 
through member states: they only have the authority granted to them by mem-
ber states, and cannot claim a broader mandate.
 54
 
Nonstate actor input through the access structures is said to be a means by 
which international organizations can transcend that limitation and claim to 
speak and function directly on behalf of the global public. NGOs are imagined 
to be representatives of that global public. Thus, NGO consultation is under-
stood to be a “basic form of popular representation”
55
 and a democratizing in-
ﬂuence
56
 because it offers international organizations a form of quasi-democratic 
legitimacy,” or at least “a plausible connection to a global constituency” beyond 
the governments of the member states.
57
 This nongovernmental input enables 
organizations to receive the views of a broad cross-section of individuals advo-
cating for different social causes through their NGO representatives, and thus 
contributes directly to the international organization’s governance mandate. 
 
50. For a description of this basic position, see Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Prob-
lematic Legitimacy Relationship Between Global Civil Society and the United Nations 16 (Am. Univ. 
Wash. Coll. of Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-71, 2008), http://ssrn
.com/abstract_id=1265839 [http://perma.cc/RXZ7-WW6E]. 
51. See id. at 26. 
52. Id. at 24. 
53. Id. at 26. 
54. See id. at 16 n.46. 
55. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 5, at 3. 
56. See Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 3 (“The growing participation and inﬂuence of non-State 
actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism.”). 
57. Anderson, supra note 50, at 16; see also TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOC-
RACY: POWER AND REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 193 (2008) (arguing that “non-
electoral mechanisms of authorization and accountability could potentially be employed to 
confer democratic legitimacy upon a range of agents of public power in global politics, includ-
ing [international organizations]”). 
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Thus, the strong view has both descriptive and normative dimensions. Descrip-
tively, the view asserts that international organizations act with a broader and 
more legitimate mandate when they respond to the views and opinions of global 
publics and not just their governmental representatives. Thus, a mechanism to 
solicit and incorporate those views serves to confer excess legitimacy and demo-
cratic mandate on international organizations. Normatively, then, in this view 
the “consultation” or other mechanisms for incorporating the views of nonstate 
actors are beneﬁcial to global governance. 
On that latter normative point, Steven Charnovitz argues that an individual 
can “delegate the function of representing himself,” to an NGO.
58
 Because this 
choice is voluntary, “[o]ne should not assume that on any particular issue . . . an 
individual has delegated more decisionmaking authority to an elected politician 
rather to an NGO.”
59
 Conversely, the voting power does not equate to an indi-
vidual choice of elected representatives, as the individual’s choice may not pre-
vail.
60
 Charnovitz’s point is that this representative role of NGOs should justify 
their access to international organizations and officials, and militate against ex-
cluding them from processes and deliberation that lead to international lawmak-
ing.
61
 
In sum, the strong legitimacy optimism position suggests that nonstate ac-
tors contribute to international lawmaking and governance through their func-
tion as representatives of the interests of individuals. 
b. Moderate Legitimacy Optimism  
Moderate legitimacy optimism does not claim that the consultation mecha-
nism can directly confer a democratic or representational mandate on interna-
tional organizations. But it does assert that opening a law- and policy-making 
process to nonstate groups can enhance legitimacy and assist an organization in 
governing effectively.
62
 The claim is thus more modest and descriptive than 
 
58. Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 891, 
905 (2011). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See id. Relatedly, Terry MacDonald has proposed a “Global Stakeholder Democracy” model, 
which he suggests could employ the representation of “multi-stakeholder” interests by 
NGOs—either to supplement or to substitute for the representation of nation-state constitu-
encies by governments. MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 14. 
62. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 22, at 1515-23 (outlining various alternatives to democratic accounta-
bility that may serve as sources of potential legitimacy for international organizations); Kings-
bury et al., supra note 10, at 15, 17 (identifying an “embryonic ﬁeld of global administrative 
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strong legitimacy optimism. The central claim is that access and consultation 
mechanisms can be especially useful when international organizations do not 
have adequate enforcement mechanisms to impose their legal rules by force on 
recalcitrant nation-states. Thus, offering access and consultation opportunities 
to nonstate actors can assist an international organization in gathering legiti-
macy that will enhance the persuasive power of the rules the organization devel-
ops.
63
 The idea is that offering different groups opportunities to submit input 
during a rulemaking process can enhance the credibility of international rules 
among those groups and build support for the rules among national govern-
ments, which may otherwise be subject to lobbying efforts by disaffected groups. 
Finally, allowing private groups access to the rulemaking process potentially can 
enhance transparency by allowing those groups to disseminate information 
about it to their members. 
For example, Claire Kelly builds on accounts by Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye to describe legitimacy as a product of inputs (“the means by which constit-
uents participate in [international organizations], e.g., representation, inclusive-
ness, or process”)
64
 and outputs (“substantive outcomes, e.g., trade liberaliza-
tion . . . or fairness, and whether goals set by the [international organizations] 
themselves are reached, i.e., is the [international organization] effective”).
65
 
Thus, in the input/output legitimacy account advanced by Kelly and others, in-
put legitimacy focuses on the representativeness of the rulemaking, including 
participation by those who will be affected by the rule, and the fairness and trans-
parency of the deliberative process.
66
 Output legitimacy focuses on the outcomes 
of the rulemaking. Is a rule “fair, just, well ordered, universally accepted, or sup-
portive of a particular goal”?
67
 Output legitimacy also inquires whether the 
 
law” that has bolstered the legitimacy of international organizations through “standards of 
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, . . . legality, and . . . effective review”). 
63. See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 97-104 (2013). 
64. Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 613–
14 (2008) (citing Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Between Centralization and Fragmentation: 
The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 9–10 (Har-
vard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP01-004, 2001), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=262175 [http://perma.cc/RVV7-P2MD]). 
65. Kelly, supra note 16, at 123. 
66. Id.; see also Esty, supra note 22, at 1524 (proposing that international organization legitimacy 
can be improved by using traditional administrative law devices, such as notice, comment, 
and power sharing). 
67. Kelly, supra note 16, at 124 (arguing that since a better, more inclusive, and more transparent 
process can enhance legitimacy, an important question is whether NGOs help or hinder this). 
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norms are “useful,” and notes that usefulness can often be enhanced by the ex-
pertise of the inputs.
68
 In short, those who measure input/output legitimacy ac-
cept the premise that consultation with outsiders can enhance the legitimacy of 
an organization and the rules it produces. For this reason, I characterize these 
accounts as moderately legitimacy optimistic. 
Moderate legitimacy optimism thus characterizes intellectual movements 
like global administrative law, which works to identify groups that can offer ex-
pertise and “technocratic competence” that enhance the output legitimacy of var-
ious global administrative projects. In addition, Kenneth Abbott and David 
Gartner celebrate participation by a mix of groups, or “multiple, countervailing 
interests—such as NGOs, business groups, and technical experts,” as a way of 
balancing the deliberative process.
69
 Abbott and Gartner see this diversity as a 
means of preserving equilibrium and preventing capture of lawmakers by any 
one group. 
In sum, according to accounts that advance moderate legitimacy optimism, 
consultation with private groups—whether they be experts, NGOs, businesses, 
or others—can enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of international organi-
zations and their rulemaking processes. These accounts stop short of strong le-
gitimacy optimism because they do not assert that this consultation legitimizes 
organizations by transforming them into direct representatives of any particular 
group of people. 
c. Legitimacy Pessimism 
Legitimacy pessimism starkly contrasts with strong legitimacy optimism. It 
expresses the view that international organizations and NGOs have been caught 
in a “closed legitimation-circle”
70
: NGOs confer apparent legitimacy on interna-
tional organizations by claiming to speak for populations affected by the deci-
sions of those organizations. This allows international organizations to claim the 
authority of representational quasi-democracy. In turn, those international or-
ganizations legitimate the work of the NGOs, which exist only to advocate for a 
 
68. Id.; see also Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 29 (noting the value of expertise for “policy 
formulation and legitimacy”). 
69. See Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 26. 
70. Anderson, supra note 50, at 34.  
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cause before the international organizations.
71
 The two exist in reciprocal sym-
biosis in a closed loop, with no external checks on the accuracy of their claims.
72
 
Thus NGOs are seen as “self-appointed spokesmen for their cause” or even “a 
self-serving coterie of elitists.”
73
 The legitimacy pessimist position observes that 
because NGOs are unelected, they cannot be truly representative of any particu-
lar group of people and “need not answer to the broad public they claim to rep-
resent.”
74
 Kenneth Anderson is a key proponent of this position, which he artic-
ulates in the following way: 
[T]o ask about accountability is really to ask whether NGOs are repre-
sentative of those they claim (or once claimed) to represent and whether 
they merit the legitimacy that they claim such representativeness confers. 
In this sense, to ask about accountability is [to ask] . . . whether a basis 
exists for them to be invested with such power in the ﬁrst place . . . . [I]f 
it is on the basis of representing “people” or “peoples” or “the world’s 
Peoples,” then we should not . . . presume the quite radical conclusion 
that they have a legitimate claim to “represent” and account for the inter-
ests and desires and values of all these “people” in the ﬁrst place.
75
  
Rather than enhancing the legitimacy of international organizations, these 
NGOs at best have a neutral effect on international processes, and at worst chal-
lenge the legitimacy or effectiveness of them. At times, they have even challenged 
the legitimacy of the national governments that delegate power to international 
institutions. In fact, as Kenneth Anderson notes, fascist regimes such as Musso-
lini’s or Franco’s also treated civil society organizations as “representative, inter-
mediary organizations between the people and the states” to try to make up for 
their lack of “ballot box legitimacy.” These fascist regimes therefore supported 
supposed civil society organizations as substitutes. This self-legitimating circle 
 
71. Similar concerns have been aired in the U.S. domestic context. See, e.g., Moshe Cohen-Eliya 
& Yoav Hammer, Nontransparent Lobbying as a Democratic Failure, 23 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 
265, 268 n.12 (2011) (citing David Lowery, Why do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, 
Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 36-37 (2007)) (noting that organizations fre-
quently lobby even when they do not expect success for the purpose of demonstrating to their 
supporters that they are active and to justify continued support). 
72. Anderson, supra note 50, at 34. 
73. MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 4 (internal citations omitted). 
74. Id. at 4 (noting concerns about NGO representativeness and accountability). 
75. Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability Means—and Does Not Mean, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 
170, 176 (2009). 
the yale law journal 127:1742  2018 
1764 
cannot substitute, Anderson and others claim, for authentic democratic legiti-
macy.
76
 
2. The Normative Dimension: Strong Legitimacy Optimism as Reform 
Principle 
Strong legitimacy optimism has shaped legal reforms. Speciﬁcally, because 
legitimacy optimism operates from the descriptive premise that consultation can 
confer legitimacy on international organizations, it carries with it a normative 
claim that reforms should therefore operate to enhance the access, representa-
tiveness, and accountability of consultant groups. Thus, strong legitimacy opti-
mism led to reforms at ECOSOC in 1996 that expanded access rights for NGOs
77
 
and that attempted to enhance the representative nature of NGO participation 
as consultants. For example, Resolution 1996/31 introduced a number of regu-
lations aimed at ensuring that NGOs actually represent the interests of their 
members and that NGO governance documents evidence and safeguard this rep-
resentational character: 
10. The organization shall . . . have a democratically adopted constitu-
tion, . . . which shall provide for the determination of policy by a confer-
ence, congress or other representative body and for an executive organ 
responsible to the policy-making body[;] 
11 . . . . shall have authority to speak for its members through its author-
ized representatives[;] 
12 . . . . [and] shall have a representative structure and possess appropri-
ate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise ef-
fective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting 
rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making 
processes.
78
 
The 1996 reform also responded to concerns about the problem of 
overrepresentation of NGOs from the Global North and underrepresentation 
 
76. Anderson, supra note 50, at 24 (citing John Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seri-
ously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (2000), for the proposition that “[i]t is . . . precisely the de-
tachment from governments that makes international civil society so troubling, at least for 
democracies” because it “posits ‘interests’ . . . as legitimate actors along with popularly elected 
governments”). 
77. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3. 
78. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 
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from the Global South. Resolution 1996/31 noted that ECOSOC sought “just, 
balanced, effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations 
from all regions and areas of the world,”
79
 and in particular, greater participation 
from developing countries and countries in transition.
80
 
The twelve-member Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil So-
ciety Relations that considered further reforms to the ECOSOC access structure 
in 2004 continued to embrace strong legitimacy optimism as a principle of re-
form.
81
 For example, the report they produced (known as the Cardoso Report) 
advocated “forging stronger links between [NGOs at] the local and global levels, 
which would help overcome democratic deﬁcits in global governance,”
82
 and 
again focused on representational disparities between the Global North and 
South. Nevertheless, the Cardoso panel’s ﬁndings also reported concerns by na-
tional governments about the “legitimacy, accountability and ‘hidden agendas’” 
of NGO consultants: 
Many of the accredited NGOs are perceived as lobbyists rather than 
“true” stakeholders. Most are seen as not accountable while demanding 
higher government accountability. Many governments feel they, being 
elected, are the legitimate representatives of society.
83
  
The concerns aired in the 1996 reforms and Cardoso Report reveal a funda-
mental normative assumption that it is NGOs’ democratizing and representa-
tional qualities that qualify them to participate as consultants to international 
organizations. For example, if the principal concern were to gather sufficient ex-
pertise to develop an efficient or workable rule, the principal analysis would not 
be whether an NGO represents its members, but whether the organization prof-
fers representatives with scientiﬁc, technocratic, or other qualiﬁcations. 
After signiﬁcant attention in the 1990s and 2000s, scholarly promotion of 
strong legitimacy optimism as either a descriptive theory or principle of reform 
has ebbed. As far as the legal rules themselves, the UN has not responded to the 
reform proposals of the Cardoso Report, and the access rules continue to require 
 
79. Id. ¶ 5. 
80. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. 
81. Cardoso Report, supra note 4. 
82. Press Brieﬁngs by Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations, UNITED NATIONS (June 21, 2004), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2004/Cardoso062104.doc.htm [http://perma.cc/5MGD-B8MU]. 
83. UN System and Civil Society - An Inventory and Analysis of Practices: Background Paper for  
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil  
Society, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (May 2003) [hereinafter Inventory], http://www.globalpolicy.org 
/component/content/article/226/32330.html [http://perma.cc/QT74-W7XE]. 
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features of NGOs—like constitutional governance and democratically selected 
representatives—that appear to be premised on strong legitimacy optimism. The 
signiﬁcance of these regulatory choices persists. In addition to the fact that there 
are roughly ﬁve thousand associations accredited with ECOSOC,
84
 an array of 
other international organizations have followed in ECOSOC’s path by adopting 
the ECOSOC structure, permitting basic forms of “consultation,” and requiring 
basic forms of representation. 
i i .  why strong legitimacy optimism fails 
The primary reason for the tenacity of strong legitimacy optimism as a guide 
to regulatory design appears to be the persistent and deeply entrenched idea that 
the nonstate groups who obtain access this way ﬁt a certain mold. The idea is 
that these participants are virtuous nonproﬁt groups championing social goods 
and the views of individuals, minorities, and social groups who are not ade-
quately represented by national delegations. This is not to say that this premise 
has gone without challenge. Principally, however, as the previous Section de-
scribed, responses to perceived deﬁcits in accountability and representativeness 
have consisted of proposals to further promote participation by virtuous groups, 
rather than to supplant the “consultation as democracy” idea at the heart of 
strong legitimacy optimism.  
As it turns out, however, the nonstate groups gaining access to international 
organizations are very diverse. For example, business groups make signiﬁcant 
use of the access rules alongside the classic public-interest actors that the con-
ventional account imagines. The presence of business actors brings the existing 
criticisms of that frame into focus. This Part uses these facts to illustrate the de-
scriptive inaccuracy of strong legitimacy optimism and the persistent access 
problems it fails to address as a principle of reform. In short, while business lob-
bying appears to repudiate the premises of strong legitimacy optimism, busi-
nesses also contribute to the work of international organizations in socially ben-
eﬁcial ways. The access rules do not respond appropriately to either of these 
facts. 
A. Explanatory Faults: The Question of Business 
Business groups use the access rules to offer input to international organiza-
tions in both overt and covert modes. These facts show that the conventional 
 
84. NGO Branch, Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. 
& SOC. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&
sessionCheck=false [http://perma.cc/KPK8-KBJL]. 
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account fails in two ways. It mischaracterizes both the nature of the groups mak-
ing use of the access structures and the nature of the access opportunities pre-
sented to these groups. 
1. Overt Business Access
85
 
Academic attention to the access rules has been focused principally on classic 
public-interest NGOs. As Anderson articulates this orientation: 
[T]he meaning of the term [civil society] in the international community 
is reserved for politically “progressive” organizations, deﬁned in broad 
terms as a leftwing politics and an orientation toward global governance 
over merely democratic sovereign governance. The legion academic lit-
erature on global civil society largely assumes that it is about the leftwing 
Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace . . . and that it is committed to 
. . . the idea of global governance.
86
 
Perhaps this scholarly focus arises from the fact that the accreditation oppor-
tunities have been of interest primarily to civil society groups seeking to advance 
a particular cause (and usually, in Anderson’s view, a socially liberal one). Nev-
ertheless, the accreditation structure is also a point of entry for international 
business groups, who may consult on the same terms as the public-interest 
NGOs, provided that the business group meets the accreditation criteria. In par-
ticular, in the ECOSOC context, the business group must be organized as a non-
proﬁt and report “aims and purposes” consistent with ECOSOC’s purposes.
87
 
Since ECOSOC’s own aims and purposes include economic development, many 
private-sector groups can demonstrate such a link. 
In fact, ECOSOC’s screening of would-be consultant groups is not focused 
on determining which interests the group represents, aside from the bare deter-
mination that the group advances some elements of ECOSOC’s work. Nor do 
the screening criteria focus on the makeup of the group’s membership, other 
than to evaluate whether the group has some means of maintaining accountabil-
ity to that membership. In practice, the rules have been interpreted to mean that 
 
85. This subsection draws substantially on a short essay previously published in AJIL Unbound as 
part of a Symposium on Industry Associations in Transnational Legal Ordering. See Melissa 
J. Durkee, Industry Lobbying and “Interest Blind” Access Norms at International Organizations, 111 
AJIL UNBOUND 119 (2017). 
86. Anderson, supra note 50, at 32 (footnote omitted) (critiquing this view as excluding conserva-
tive and religious civil society groups). 
87. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 2-3. 
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an association’s members may be either individuals, businesses, or other entities. 
Thus, business advocacy groups—trade and industry associations—may become 
accredited as consultants to ECOSOC. In fact, they can become accredited along-
side and on the same terms as NGOs who advance various social causes. How-
ever, individual businesses cannot become accredited to consult unless they are 
organized as nonproﬁts. 
Indeed, of the approximately 5,000 associations that are now accredited as 
consultants to ECOSOC, a full ten percent self-report “business and industry” 
as an area of expertise or ﬁeld of activity.
88
 That ﬁgure likely underreports the 
total number of associations representing the private sector, as it merely reﬂects 
the number of associations that explicitly report this focus. Examples of accred-
ited business and industry associations include: 
 Global sectoral associations, such as the World Coal Association and the 
World Nuclear Association; 
 Regional sectoral associations, such as the National Association of Home 
Builders of the United States, the European Association of Automotive 
Suppliers, and the Association of Latin American Railways; and 
 Generalist organizations, whether global or regional, such as the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, the World Union of Small and Me-
dium Enterprises, and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
Industrialists. 
Many of these associations have disclosed that their principal organizational 
purposes include lobbying. For example, the World Coal Association lists among 
its goals that it aims to “[a]ssist in the creation of a political climate supportive 
of action by governments” to use various kinds of coal technologies, and to ed-
ucate policymakers about the beneﬁts of coal and the coal industry.
89
 The World 
Nuclear Association “seeks to promote the peaceful worldwide use of nuclear 
 
88. NGO Branch, supra note 84. In the “Consultative status” ﬁeld, select “General,” “Special,” and 
“Roster” and add them to the search ﬁeld; expand “Areas of expertise & Fields of activity”; 
then select “Economic and Social” and add “Business and Industry” to search ﬁeld; designate 
“search type” as “[a]ll the criteria above”; then search. Id. (listing 514 organizations that se-
lected “business and industry” as of October 2017). 
89. NGO Branch, World Coal Association, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://
esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method=showProﬁleDetails& 
sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=1029 [http://perma.cc/B2CC-67G9]. 
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power.”
90
 The National Association of Home Builders of the United States seeks 
to “[b]alance legislative, regulatory and judicial public policy.”
91
  
Thus, business-promoting groups work alongside, and on equal terms with, 
familiar public-interest NGOs like the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and Heifer Pro-
ject International. All of these accredited groups, public interest and private sec-
tor alike, enjoy the same potential menu of access privileges. 
2. Covert Business Access 
Businesses access international lawmakers and officials not just overtly, 
through industry and trade associations, but also covertly. In a prior article, I 
identiﬁed an “astroturf activism” phenomenon whereby “business entities gain 
access to international lawmakers through front groups that obscure the identity 
of the proﬁt-seeking enterprise.”
92
 One way businesses gain this covert access is 
through grassroots mimicry: forming NGOs with nonproﬁt status and a mission 
statement that obscures the association’s true agenda.
93
 John Braithwaite and Pe-
ter Drahos offer some choice examples of this phenomenon, noting the “Na-
tional Wetlands Coalition,” which serves U.S. oil companies and real estate de-
velopers, and “Consumers for World Trade,” which was formed by a pro-GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) industry coalition.
94
 
In addition to forming astroturf groups, businesses have formed sponsor-
ship or other close relationships with public-interest NGOs, suggesting some 
degree of capture or—at minimum—inﬂuence.
95
 According to a study of one 
hundred inﬂuential NGOs in 2013, 54% had at least one board member affiliated 
with the tobacco industry, 56% with the arms industry, and 59% with the ﬁnance 
 
90. NGO Branch, World Nuclear Association, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://
esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method=showProﬁleDetails& 
sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=1047 [http://perma.cc/BK3B-HMPM]. 
91. NGO Branch, National Association of Home Builders of the United States, UNITED NATIONS  
DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProﬁleDetail.do?method
=showProﬁleDetails&sessionCheck=false&tab=3&proﬁleCode=6881 [http://perma.cc
/CGX6-BZBM]. 
92. Durkee, supra note 14, at 229. 
93. Id. at 238. 
94. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 11, at 489.  
95. Durkee, supra note 14, at 241-42. 
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industry.
96
 Of the NGOs in the study, 40% have obtained accreditation at 
ECOSOC.
97
 
Businesses also access the accreditation structure covertly by capturing trade 
associations.
98
 For example, in an effort to defeat the WHO’s tobacco regulation 
efforts, multinational tobacco companies like Philip Morris and British American 
Tobacco transformed the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA) 
“from an underfunded and disorganized group of tobacco farmers into a highly 
effective lobbying organization”
99
 purporting to speak on behalf of developing-
world tobacco farmers. The ITGA lobbied the FAO, World Bank, and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development “to oppose or undermine WHO 
tobacco control activities.”
100
 
3. The Signiﬁcance of Business Access 
The presence of businesses among the groups who gain access to officials 
and lawmakers through the access rules sharpens the critiques of the legitimacy 
pessimists. That business groups are accredited NGOs in this context entails that 
the persons NGOs represent are not just natural people but also juridical peo-
ple—that is, business entities constituted by states. NGOs are not always even 
purporting to be representatives of the “global public”; rather, some overtly ad-
vance the interests of corporate constituencies.
101
 Others do so non-transpar-
ently.
102
 As the previous subsections clariﬁed, trade and industry associations, 
organized as nonproﬁts, can and do make use of international accreditation re-
 
96. Id. at 242 (citing Fairouz El Tom, Diversity and Inclusion on NGO Boards: What the Stats Say, 
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2013, 5:56 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development 
-professionals-network/2013/apr/29/diversity-inclusion-ngo-board [http://perma.cc
/M5VG-WY5K]). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 206. 
99. Id. at 240-41 (quoting COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUS. DOCUMENTS, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 47 (2000) [hereinafter TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES], 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WKS-5N3X]). 
100. Id. at 241 (quoting TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES, supra note 99, at 48). 
101. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (offering proﬁt-oriented mission statements for 
a number of organizations with consultative status). 
102. See supra Section II.A.2 (reviewing business methods to create or make use of apparently pub-
lic-interest NGOs to gain access to international organizations through consultative status). 
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gimes to advocate for their corporate interests in international laws and poli-
cies.
103
 Both kinds of group—public-interest and private-sector—can play the 
same two-level game, lobbying domestically and internationally to advance their 
preferred legal rules.
104
 
4. The Poverty of Access 
Strong legitimacy optimism overstates the quality and quantity of access 
consultant groups receive. Strong legitimacy optimism imagines a “participatory 
revolution,”
105
 and a quantum of input by NGOs akin to representative vot-
ing.
106
 Moderate legitimacy optimism also envisions robust contributions to 
lawmaking, capable of improving the input and output legitimacy of the ulti-
mate rule.
107
 But, in many cases, the quantity of access nonstate actors enjoy, and 
the amount of inﬂuence they wield, are much more impoverished than these 
theories suggest. In particular, participatory rights are limited, NGOs are not 
always allowed the full measure of access rights they are due,
108
 and formal con-
sultative rights can provide minimal inﬂuence over the lawmaking process.
109
  
What kinds of access and inﬂuence do the consultation rules afford? For-
mally three kinds: information rights, such as the capacity to receive press re-
leases; rights to make written and—at times—oral comments; and opportunities 
to lobby informally by accessing UN facilities and places where lawmakers and 
 
103. See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2 (reviewing the lobbying aims of associations that have received 
accreditation at ECOSOC). 
104. See generally Putnam, supra note 6 (theorizing that the negotiating behavior of national leaders 
reﬂects the dual and simultaneous pressures of international and domestic political games). 
105. Raustiala, supra note 22, at 537; see also Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Global Environmental 
Governance, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 139, 148 (2005) (noting the increased participation of 
NGOs in international environmental organizations). 
106. See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
107. See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
108. See Emanuele Rebasti, Beyond Consultative Status: Which Legal Framework for Enhanced Inter-
action Between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations?, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 21, 32 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008). 
109. See Inventory, supra note 83; see also Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Steinar Andresen, NGO Inﬂuence 
in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks, 4 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 54, 59 (2004) (noting that many of the ﬁnal negotiations in treaty con-
ference delegations are conducted behind closed doors, shutting out accredited NGOs). 
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officials gather.
110
 But in surveys of NGO perceptions about the signiﬁcance of 
their own access, NGOs have said that formal conferral of these rights is not a 
sufficient means of facilitating their “participation” in international lawmaking 
and governance.
111
  
One problem is that the “patterns of interaction” with international organi-
zations “depart[] signiﬁcantly from the one embodied in” the formal consulta-
tive relationship.
112
 Rather than facilitating increased “participation,” NGOs ob-
ject that their interaction with lawmakers can be almost purely informal, with 
the most signiﬁcant feature of consultative status being the right to an access 
badge giving them access to “corridors, cafeteria and other sites at various UN 
headquarters.”
113
 When it comes to large international treaty conferences where 
NGOs show up in droves, groups can fare even worse. They are often relegated 
to a large conference facility separate from the main negotiations and have little 
effect on that process.
114
 Instead, much of the NGO inﬂuence takes place at the 
domestic or transnational level prior to the negotiations, as NGOs lobby national 
delegates to persuade them to adopt particular negotiating positions.
115
 
The poverty of the access rules is again clariﬁed by a focus on business con-
tributions. Offering trade and industry groups opportunities to submit substan-
tive input during a rulemaking process can enhance the credibility of the ultimate 
rule among that group’s constituents. Soliciting views can help build support for 
the rule among national governments, which may otherwise be subject to lob-
bying efforts at the national level by disaffected private-sector groups.
116
 Finally, 
allowing private groups access to the rulemaking process potentially can enhance 
transparency by allowing those groups to disseminate information about that 
lawmaking process to their members. For example, a private-sector association 
 
110. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (outlining scope of consultation 
opportunities at ECOSOC). See generally PETER WILLETTS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 32-63 (2011) (re-
viewing different NGO modes of access to global policy-makers). 
111. See Rebasti, supra note 108, at 31. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 32. 
114. See Inventory, supra note 83; see also Gulbrandsen & Andresen, supra note 109, at 59 & n.13 
(noting that NGOs had to rely mostly on “corridor politics” and “distribution of documents 
during session breaks,” and referencing NGO-sponsored “side events”). See generally Rebasti, 
supra note 111, at 31-37 (reviewing additional ways that the consultation rules inadequately 
facilitate NGO participation). 
115. See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 154-61. 
116. Durkee, supra note 63, at 78-81. 
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was instrumental in developing the Cape Town Convention on International In-
terests in Mobile Equipment, a treaty that standardizes ﬁnancing for aircraft and 
other mobile equipment and has been hailed as perhaps “the most signiﬁcant 
piece of private international law in recent history.”
117
 In particular, the Aviation 
Working Group, an association formed by market titans Airbus Industrie and 
the Boeing Company, offered signiﬁcant feedback to UNIDROIT on the aircraft 
manufacturing industry’s preferred ﬁnancing rules, and then later launched a 
major campaign encouraging state governments to adopt the convention and of-
fering states best practices for implementation.
118
 
There is also established evidence that private-sector groups can enhance the 
quality of information available to international organization decisionmakers, at 
least in some contexts. Private-sector associations can offer expertise about what 
legal standards might work in a given situation, what alternatives may be avail-
able, and what potential externalities may arise. For example, as the Cape Town 
Convention was being developed, “[t]he Aviation Working Group assembled a 
series of detailed drafts . . . which included extremely technical deﬁnitions of air-
craft and aircraft engines”—information that would have only been available to 
industry insiders.
119
 They also “proposed useful default remedies and priority 
rules, and designed the international [online] registry” to record priority of in-
terests.
120
 Another private-sector association, the International Air Transport As-
sociation (IATA), suggested an innovative treaty design approach that was ulti-
mately adopted in the ﬁnal text.
121
 Finally, the Aviation Working Group was 
successful at convincing governmental representatives to adopt a text that would 
depart in some respects from legal cultural norms that diverged across civil and 
common law jurisdictions.
122
 In short, commentators conclude that this private-
sector association participation was “critically important,”
123
 and of “inestimable 
value” to the ultimate success of the treaty.
124
 
 
117. Sandeep Gopalan, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons from the Cape Town Convention 
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 255 (2003). 
118. See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 294-96 (2016). 
119. Id. at 295. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 295-96. 
123. Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town Convention and Proto-
cols, 17 UNIFORM L. REV. 599, 606 (2012). 
124. Id. at 603. 
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Accruing all of these beneﬁts requires meaningful access to lawmakers, rather 
than a consultation structure that facilitates a “medieval fair” sideshow purport-
ing to be a participatory structure.
125
 Kenneth Abbott and David Gartner com-
pare the consultation rules to what they see as truly participatory multistake-
holder structures adopted by “a new generation of global health institutions.”
126
 
Those structures—such as the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)—“incorporat[e] civil society 
representatives and other non-state actors directly into formal decision-making 
bodies.”
127
 These actors, including “[NGOs], the private sector, private founda-
tions, and other constituencies within civil society,” have seats on the board and 
full voting capacity in the new institutions.
128
 Abbott and Gartner characterize 
this structure as “direct participation” and contrast it with “mere consultative 
process,” arguing that the former has a number of important advantages, includ-
ing improving input and output legitimacy, enhancing the effectiveness of these 
institutions, and grooming civil society leadership.
129
 They also recognize par-
ticular difficulties that could inhere to these multistakeholder structures, such as 
inefficiency, but note that these problems have not arisen in the context of the 
innovative public health structures on which their study focuses.
130
  
While strong legitimacy optimism imagines global publics voting through 
representative NGOs, the consultation structure offers something closer to un-
structured lobbying access to those able to take advantage of it. The contrast be-
tween these forms of access and those of next generation multistakeholder insti-
tutions demonstrates the limitations of the former. 
*** 
 To summarize the insights of this Section, strong legitimacy optimism does 
not accurately characterize either the diversity of actors who obtain access to in-
ternational organizations or the quantum of access those nonstate participants 
receive. The presence of business groups—acting in both overt and covert 
ways—clariﬁes these descriptive failures. The suggestion is nuanced: while busi-
ness input can be useful to the legitimacy and effectiveness of international or-
ganizations and the rules they produce, that input contributes to the input and 
output legitimacy that moderate legitimacy optimists study. Its presence chal-
lenges the democratic assumptions of strong legitimacy optimism.  
 
125. Inventory, supra note 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126. Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 3-4. 
127. Id. at 3. 
128. Id. at 4. 
129. Id. at 4, 5, 25-34. 
130. Id. at 25. 
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B. Practical Faults: Persistent Regulatory Defects 
These failures of description correlate with failures in regulatory practice. To 
summarize these regulatory failings—most of which have been previewed in the 
prior discussion—the current system suffers from problems related to transpar-
ency, access, gatekeeping, administrability, and legitimacy. 
Transparency. The fact that the consultancy rules exclude for-proﬁt entities 
has resulted in the astroturf activism phenomenon, whereby businesses create or 
co-opt nonproﬁt groups to serve as front groups to promote their causes within 
international organizations.
131
 This creates a transparency problem, as the actors 
driving the agendas of various organizations are obscured. 
Access. The rules also create an access problem, as for-proﬁt actors cannot 
consult directly but must aggregate their views through trade associations, create 
astroturf NGOs, or co-opt existing groups to communicate on their behalves.
132
 
Gatekeeping. The gatekeeping system is overburdened with the task of eval-
uating the suitability of numerous organizations for admission to the consul-
tancy according to a complex set of rules that includes evaluations of NGOs’ in-
ternal governance structures, accountability to memberships, nonproﬁt 
registration status, constitutional structure, and other factors.
133
 As a result, the 
gatekeepers enforce the rules idiosyncratically, occasionally allowing access to 
entities that should clearly be excluded (such as for-proﬁt entities), barring ac-
cess to others for purely political reasons, and ﬂoundering under a persistent 
backlog.
134
 
Effectiveness. The consultation regime faces criticisms that the sheer number 
of associations that are admitted results in a “medieval fair” sort of sideshow that 
does not amount to meaningful consultation with international officials.
135
 
Sometimes, as a result, accredited associations are not granted the forms of ac-
cess to officials they believe they are formally due.
136
 
 
131. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44; cf. MACDONALD, supra note 57, at 2 (noting that “corpo-
rations have attempted to enhance their perceived public legitimacy by establishing ‘partner-
ships’ or ‘stakeholder dialogues’ with NGOs”). 
132. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44. 
133. See id. at 247, 256-57. 
134. See id. at 256-57; see also Rebasti, supra note 111, at 29-30 (noting gatekeeping problems, such 
as when the 19-member committee charged with considering NGO applications to ECOSOC 
often “appeared to be led more by political than by technical considerations”). 
135. Inventory, supra note 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136. See Rebasti, supra note 111, at 31-33 (noting a number of instances in which NGOs complained 
that their access had been curbed). 
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Legitimacy. The transparency, gatekeeping, and effectiveness problems lead 
to legitimacy problems, as the system fails to deliver diverse perspectives and 
meaningful engagement with nonstate actors.
137
 Moreover, in some circum-
stances, nonstate actors can have too much inﬂuence, even undue inﬂuence.
138
 
Some nonstate actors use their access privileges to dominate the conversation in 
a way that may harm the perceived legitimacy of a ﬁnal product.
139
 
C. Why the Critique Matters 
A business presence among those groups obtaining access to international 
organizations complicates conventional accounts of the purpose and effects of 
that access system, as we have seen. Identifying that site of business inﬂuence 
also contributes to literatures on business roles in international governance, of-
fers a new way of thinking about reforms to the access structures, and has the 
potential to curb the development of a customary international legal rule that 
confers greater international legal status to corporate entities. 
1. Highlights an Underappreciated Site of Business Inﬂuence 
This account contributes to literatures that analyze business roles in interna-
tional lawmaking but have not yet focused on the consultation structures. That 
literature has focused on rich description, ferreting out private-sector roles in 
international rulemaking using a variety of theoretical lenses.  
Liberal theory focuses on business as one of the interest groups that shape 
nation-state preferences at the international level through domestic lobbying.
140
 
 
137. See Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 16, 25 (proposing to “bring[] people from diverse back-
grounds together to identify possible policy breakthroughs on emerging global priorities,” 
and noting the growing inﬂuence of nonstate actors in multiconstituency partnerships); see 
also Rebasti, supra note 111, at 33 (noting that, in practice, the consultation system “risks work-
ing to the disadvantage of the smallest, less resourced and less networked organizations and 
thus, in general, of southern-based NGOs”). 
138. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 229-44. 
139. See Kelly, supra note 16. 
140. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 10 (elaborating liberal theory in international relations and 
explaining that domestic constituencies construct state interests). 
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Interest group lobbying might aim to secure domestic compliance with interna-
tional legal rules,
141
 for example, or to harmonize rules in the various jurisdic-
tions in which a business entity operates.
142
 Liberal theory has also inspired net-
work theories which sometimes recognize the signiﬁcance of nonstate actor 
networks operating transnationally to shape international law and policy.
143
  
The global administrative law project has focused particular attention on 
rulemaking
144
 through private or hybrid organizations like, for example, the In-
ternational Standards Organization (ISO), which harmonizes product and pro-
cess rules; the Fair Labor Association which sets standards for sports apparel; 
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a 
once-private body that has come to include governmental representatives as 
well.
145
 This literature observes that business entities self-regulate by engaging 
in regulatory arbitrage, by setting up governance regimes in underregulated 
spaces such as their own supply chains;
146
 by developing practices that develop 
over time into “law that is just as real . . . [as] treaties”;
147
 or by creating private 
standards that are later codiﬁed in treaty law.
148 
 
141. See Brewster, supra note 8; see also Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 170-84 (conceiving of the sov-
ereign state as an agent of small interest groups). 
142. See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 173. 
143. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 10 (conceptualizing this activity as transgovernmental net-
works). 
144. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 18, 22-23; see also Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corpo-
rations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?, 
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 803, 803 (2011) (asserting that transnational corporations are 
“political actors who are increasingly involved in the progressive development and enforce-
ment of the regulatory structures of the international economic system,” speciﬁcally the World 
Trade Organization and foreign investment regime). 
145. Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 22-23. 
146. Id.; see also Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Mul-
tinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 762-72 (2011) (noting that businesses self-regulate through regula-
tory arbitrage, and also self-regulate by creating rules for their supply chains); Kishanthi 
Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 753-56 (2014) (noting that 
corporations are increasingly responsible for regulating throughout their “global value 
chains”). 
147. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade 
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2005). 
148. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 56-61 (describing the mechanism whereby the WTO Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures incorporates privately elaborated standards). 
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Global legal pluralism and related accounts also focus on privately created 
legal rules.
149
 For example, the new “lex mercatoria” is a global commercial law 
shaped by nonstate actors and sometimes adopted into formal law by states or 
international organizations.
150
 Businesses self-regulate through private codes of 
conduct or trade association standards; sometimes these rules compete with, 
prevent, or are absorbed by publicly created law.
151
 While the global legal plu-
ralist account focuses on much of the same phenomena studied by global admin-
istrative law, the two accounts differ in approach. Global administrative law con-
siders how the multiplicity of participants in international legal process can be 
conceptualized as players in an administrative process, and how administrative 
law safeguards like transparency, participation, review, and reason-giving can 
enhance the legitimacy of that process. Global legal pluralism, by contrast, fo-
cuses on the hybrid, pluralist, and cosmopolitan nature of these overlapping 
public and private regimes and suggests tools like conﬂict-of-law rules to medi-
ate conﬂicts. 
As for the topic of this Article’s analysis—business access to international or-
ganizations—there are some excellent topical accounts on which this analysis 
builds. For example, there is a literature on “business and industry” NGOs, or 
“BINGOs,”
152
  in the environmental arena, and especially with respect to climate 
 
149. See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 41-44 (discussing areas in which state and nonstate norms come 
into conﬂict). 
150. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 447, 447 (2007) (asserting that the new lex mercatoria “freely combines elements from 
national and non-national law”). 
151. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10 (outlining the relationships among private actors, inter-
governmental organizations, and states and mapping them into a “governance triangle”). 
152. See, e.g., Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Dis-
course Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 378 (2008) (using the term “BINGO” to refer to “busi-
ness and industry nongovernmental organizations”); Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A 
Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate 
Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 220 (1999) (noting that business NGOs were active lobby-
ists at a number of different climate change treaty negotiations). 
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change.
153
 In addition, recent accounts by Susan Block-Lieb and Claire Kelly fo-
cus on industry and trade association participation at UNCITRAL.
154
 Other 
scholars focus on business involvement in the new multistakeholder governance 
structures.
155
  Thus, this account contributes to a growing literature on business 
participation in various lawmaking and governance projects,
156
 highlighting an 
important and understudied phenomenon in that realm. 
2. Confronts a Reform Standstill 
The access structure rules that ﬂow from the strong legitimacy optimist 
frame have produced an array of regulatory failings. Proposed reforms that op-
erate within this set of theoretical assumptions have not responded meaningfully 
to those failures. Eschewing that conventional theory could create opportunities 
for new regulatory solutions. 
In particular, reform attempts have not been promising. Many of the reforms 
proposed in the Cardoso Report, prepared in 2004 after a high-level study of the 
ECOSOC consultation rules, were never adopted.
157
 Some international envi-
ronmental organizations, once celebrated as examples of the success of consulta-
tion structures, have pulled back on allowing access to nonstate actors,
158
 but 
these retractions are undertheorized. At UNCITRAL, France has lodged a series 
of complaints about the consultation structure without successfully obtaining 
any meaningful reform.
159
 Recently the WHO successfully instituted a new 
“Framework of Engagement” for its interactions with nonstate actors.
160
 But the 
 
153. This literature responds in part to the fact that the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has developed a set of accreditation rules that “differentiates 
between research and independent NGOs (‘RINGOs’), business and industry NGOs (‘BIN-
GOs’), environmental NGOs (‘ENGOs’), local NGOs, indigenous peoples organizations 
(‘IPOs’), local government and municipal authorities (‘LGMAs’), islanders, trade unions, and 
faith-based groups.” Stephen Tully, Commercial Contributions to the Climate Change Regime: 
Who’s Regulating Whom?, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 14, 16 (2005). Thus, in the environ-
mental treaty literature, “BINGO” is a familiar term. 
154. See SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (2017); Kelly, supra note 16. 
155. See, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10. 
156. In a previous work, I began this project by looking at business participation through the ac-
creditation structure at ECOSOC. Durkee, supra note 14. 
157. See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 59. 
158. See Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 3. 
159. See Kelly, supra note 16. 
160. WHO, Framework, supra note 16. 
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framework institutes a patchwork of ﬁxes that may not ultimately prove to be 
any more administrable than the current ECOSOC structure. 
Focusing particularly on the proposed WHO reform, the WHO Framework 
erects a separate set of rules for “private-sector entities” and “international busi-
ness associations” as distinct from “non-governmental organizations,” with ad-
ditional safeguards in place for engagements with the private sector.
161
 The 
Framework’s safeguards are meant to guard against “conﬂicts of interest” that 
might have negative impacts on “WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and 
reputation; and public health mandate.”
162
 In this manner, the WHO Frame-
work responds to concerns about conﬂicts of interest that may arise when non-
state actors, particularly those affiliated with economic, commercial, or ﬁnancial 
interests, could unduly inﬂuence the WHO’s independence, objectivity, or pro-
fessional judgment.
163
 
But the Framework leaves to the WHO the task of discerning when an NGO 
is, or is unduly inﬂuenced by, a “private sector entity.”
164
 What the reform misses 
is that erecting categorical distinctions for the purpose of balancing representa-
tion or quashing conﬂicts of interest may send some business interests under-
ground—reducing, rather than enhancing, transparency.
165
 Moreover, the re-
forms are likely to overburden already taxed gatekeepers, resulting in application 
backlogs, incapacity to meaningfully screen applicant associations, and acci-
dental admission of noncompliant groups. Strikingly, under the WHO Frame-
work, officials are charged with independently assessing whether an association 
may harbor any private-sector inﬂuences that could potentially cause undue in-
ﬂuence over WHO officials and state delegates. This imposes a formidable bur-
den on those institutional gatekeepers in an era where NGOs often have close 
links and partnerships with the corporate world, and where business actors seek 
all potential avenues to inﬂuence international law and policy. 
Part of the reason for the lack of meaningful reforms to the ECOSOC and 
other standard access structures may simply be path dependence. There is noth-
ing predetermined about the current access structure. Rather, the structure ap-
pears to be principally the result of historical accident—the fact that the League 
 
161. Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 9-10. 
162. Id. at Annex, ¶ 7(a), (c). 
163. Id. at Annex, ¶ 22. 
164. Id. at Annex, ¶ 13. 
165. This critique was originally developed in Durkee, supra note 85, at 124, and draws substantially 
on that account. 
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of Nations had a similar consultation practice—rather than principled theory.
166
 
This is because the original Article 71 structure did not offer any signiﬁcant guid-
ance for what form “consultation” was to take. Indeed, the legislative history of 
the UN Charter appears to suggest that Article 71 was developed with very little 
debate or discussion as a concession to the NGOs in San Francisco that pushed 
for the provision.
167
 The spread of this same basic access structure throughout 
much of the UN system seems to be similarly undertheorized.
168
 
Thus, efforts to explain the access rules and consultation practice through 
the conventional legitimacy optimist account are post-hoc rationalizations. They 
do not ﬂow from the text, context, or intent of Article 71 of the UN Charter.
169
 
Nothing about the ECOSOC access structure, or the structures that follow it, are 
required by current international treaty law. Recognizing the shortcomings of 
the conventional frame offers the potential to break reform logjams by adopting 
another theory that might structure meaningful reforms. 
3. Implicates Expressive Rights of International Business 
Reforming private sector participation within the international access rules 
has the potential to curb the development of a customary international legal rule 
that would move business entities farther along the spectrum from “object” to 
“subject” status under international law. That is, a reform could prevent the de-
velopment of an international legal rule that grants additional legal standing un-
der international law to business entities. For shorthand, the reader might anal-
ogize what is at stake here to the protection of certain legal personhood rights 
for businesses in Citizens United in the United States.
170
 The argument is not 
immediately obvious, but it has signiﬁcant implications. 
 
166. Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 258 (explaining that Article 71 served to “codify the custom of 
NGO participation” that had existed in the League of Nations period prior to World War II). 
167. Id. at 249-50. 
168. See Charnovitz, supra note 13, at 358 (“Even though Article 71 refers only to ECOSOC, a con-
sultative role for NGOs gradually became an established practice throughout the UN sys-
tem.”); see also Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the spread of the Article 71 
access structure); Durkee, supra note 14, at 223-34 (discussing the signiﬁcance of Article 71). 
169. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (offering text, context, and intent as sources of authority for 
treaty interpretation). 
170. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340-41 (2010) (holding 5-4 that the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporate 
entities).  
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In addition to the debate about whether or not NGOs contribute to the le-
gitimacy or democratic accountability of international organizations, a second 
question has attracted a fair amount of attention. That is, have nonstate actors 
obtained rights to consult with nonstate organizations? And do international or-
ganizations have a duty to receive international consultation?
171
 The majority po-
sition maintains that NGOs have no consultation rights or special status as sub-
jects of international law.
172
 A minority position, however, maintains that NGOs 
do have a right to consult, or that international organizations have a duty to re-
ceive NGO consultation.
173
 
The minority argument is as follows: International customary law is devel-
oped through the consistent practice of states, accompanied by a sense of legal 
obligation to maintain that practice.
174
 International organizations operate un-
der authority delegated from states and so have some degree of delegated law-
making authority.
175
 Because a variety of international institutions have main-
tained the practice of offering consultation rights to NGOs over the past century, 
and because there is some evidence that these institutions believe these consul-
tation structures to be obligatory, international customary law may be currently 
evolving to require that international organizations continue to offer those access 
rights.
176
 
This unresolved debate raises the stakes for anyone seeking to design or re-
form international consultation rules. If these regulatory practices can harden 
over time to become binding law that governs international organizations and 
the nation-state delegates that operate within them—law from which those ac-
tors cannot legally deviate—then the features of those regulatory practices take 
on an added signiﬁcance.
177
 Lawmakers should take care to ensure that they 
 
171. See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 909 (suggesting that “state practice is moving toward a duty 
to consult NGOs in the activities of [international organizations]”).  
172. See id. 
173. See id. 
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (deﬁning international custom as “a general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”). 
175. See ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 10, at 15 (interna-
tional organizations “are institutions of limited and delegated powers”); id. at 17-45 (exploring 
theories that interrogate, inter alia, the nature and scope of these delegated powers); cf. ALVA-
REZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, 
at 18-45 (challenging the positivist conception that the activity of international organizations 
is limited to explicit delegations of authority from states). 
176. See Charnovitz, supra note 58, at 909. 
177. Even if access rules diverge to some extent across international organizations, common fea-
tures of those rules could conceivably become binding law. 
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maintain access rules and practices that best serve desired institutional and pub-
lic goods. 
That signiﬁcance is particularly acute in the case of business entities. If 
NGOs have acquired, or are in the midst of acquiring, access rights to interna-
tional institutions, then these rights must extend equally to trade and industry 
associations. This is because customary international law rules are based on prac-
tice, and there is no practice-based distinction between public-interest associa-
tions and proﬁt-promoting trade and industry associations.
178
 To the extent that 
international organizations hold a duty to consult with NGOs, the same princi-
ples apply to both kinds of associations, and international organizations can 
make no meaningful distinction between kinds of entity. The current practice 
would appear to pave the way for a set of legally mandated access rights for 
proﬁt-promoting associations, much in the same way as business entities in the 
United States have constitutionally protected speech rights.
179
 
*** 
This Part has attempted to show that strong legitimacy optimism—which 
imagines the international access rules as producing a “global people-power”
180
 
that confers excess legitimacy on international organizations—fails as an explan-
atory theory. Among other shortcomings, it has not grappled with the reality and 
signiﬁcance of the global business lobby. Moreover, strong legitimacy optimism 
has been unsuccessful as a normative principle, producing unadministrable rules 
that underregulate, overregulate, or arbitrarily regulate access. 
At the same time, existing literature on business contributions to lawmaking 
has engaged in investigative description, seeking to ferret out businesses’ law-
making methods and motivations. However, the literature has underexplored a 
traditional form of business activity (lobbying) taking place in a non-traditional 
place (international institutions). Thus, literatures regarding corporate account-
ability, social responsibility, undue inﬂuence, and lobbying have not yet ad-
dressed the international access rules. Those access rules have suffered as a result 
 
178. See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
179. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment 
confers on corporations the right to express themselves by unlimited spending on political 
speech). 
180. Press Release, Secretary-General, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing 
Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, U.N. Press 
Release SG/SM/7318 (Feb. 29, 2000) (remarks by Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000229.sgsm7318.doc.html [http://perma.cc/Q4TY 
-WSWS]. 
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of the blind spot at the intersection of these two literatures. They are now char-
acterized by problems relating to access, transparency, administrability, gate-
keeping, and legitimacy. 
Moderate legitimacy optimism holds more promise as both an explanatory 
and a normative theory. After all, even if strong legitimacy optimism is suscep-
tible to the criticisms of this Part, the Article embraces the idea that access and 
participation in rulemaking by nonstate actors can contribute to the legitimacy 
or effectiveness of an organization’s ultimate rules. However, moderate legiti-
macy optimism likely overstates the legitimacy effects of the current access rules 
and suffers from indeterminacy as a principle of reform. The challenge is to build 
reforms on accurate facts and to transform an indeterminate theory into a func-
tional guide for action. How exactly should access to international organizations 
be regulated? This is the task of the next Part. 
i i i . a theory of international lobbying law 
The international access rules should be understood as a body of lobbying 
law. The frame offers both a new analytical framework and positive law payoffs. 
Descriptively, it more accurately describes the access to international officials that 
these rules provide and the actors to which these rules offer access. Conceiving of 
the accreditation rules as lobbying rules focuses regulators on the salient features 
of these rules and identiﬁes a useful set of regulatory tools. These tools are im-
ported from U.S. domestic law lobbying strategies, international guidelines, and 
the experience of other jurisdictions like the EU. They particularly focus on reg-
istration and disclosure.  
The lobbying model responds to pressures on the international access system 
described in the prior Part and evidenced by the variety of reform proposals at 
ECOSOC, the WHO, and UNCITRAL.
181
 It also shows the limits of current 
opportunities for nonstate input in lawmaking, thereby clearing the way for re-
forms that would offer more robust kinds of participation, such as incorporating 
nonstate actors as full voting members of multistakeholder organizations. Thus, 
reframing the access rules—or “consultation” structure in the ECOSOC nomen-
clature—as international lobbying law cuts through stagnant conversations 
about legitimacy to better explain the function of the current access rules and 
update outdated, path-dependant structures to meet the demands of twenty-
ﬁrst century facts. 
 
181. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Lobbying Framework Offers a Helpful Descriptive Analogy 
Describing the international access rules as a body of international lobbying 
law offers a more faithful characterization of the facts than descriptions that 
paint these rules as a nonstate actor “consultation” regime, or a structure that 
invites nonstate actor participation in governance. As foreshadowed in Section 
II.A., the lobbying framework more accurately describes the limited access to in-
ternational officials that these rules provide. This is not a voting structure, where 
accreditation would offer nonstate actors full participation in the lawmaking 
process. Rather, it offers them many informal points of access to lawmakers 
through UN grounds passes as well as opportunities to submit written com-
ments and, at times, to raise agenda items or make statements from the ﬂoor.
182
 
Nonstate actors themselves claim that the most important feature of the consul-
tation rules is the “informal dimension,” or access to “corridors, cafeteria and 
other sites,” where they may lobby governmental delegations and other offi-
cials.
183
 In short, the access opportunities principally include access for purposes 
of informal lobbying, and groups can make of this what they will.
184
 
The lobbying frame also more accurately describes the kinds of actors that 
are granted access. These actors are not only representatives of public interest 
groups who are working to advance a concept of the public good.
185
 Rather, they 
are also private sector groups like trade and industry associations whose tradi-
tional purposes include lobbying domestic lawmakers.
186
 In addition, as the le-
gitimacy pessimists have long asserted, the actors with access often inadequately 
 
182. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3 (outlining the scope of consulta-
tion opportunities at ECOSOC). See generally WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 32-63 (outlining 
different NGO modes of access to global policy makers). 
183. Rebasti, supra note 111, at 32 (noting also that “[t]he gap between the actual means of action 
(lobbying) and the legal framework of the NGO-IGO [international governmental organiza-
tion] relationship is made clear by the cases in which, despite the formal respect for their legal 
status, advocacy NGOs are prevented from having direct access to governmental delegations,” 
which NGOs see as “crucial to the advocacy role”). 
184. See WILLETTS, supra note 110, at 61-63. 
185. Cf. Anderson, supra note 50, at 32 (noting that the established assumption that NGOs advance 
“leftwing” values is undermined by growing international prominence of industry groups like 
the National Riﬂe Association). 
186. See Sarah Dadush, Industry Associations, Governance & Chocolate 1 (Feb. 1, 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (“The most common stories about industry as-
sociations and governance focus on domestic regulatory capture.”); see also supra Sections 
II.A.1, II.A.2 (reviewing the lobbying aims of associations that have received accreditation at 
ECOSOC). 
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represent the persons or interests they purport to promote,
187
 and some are in-
ﬂuenced, or covertly co-opted, by other interest groups.
188
 
Moreover, to eschew the lobbying framework and embrace strong legitimacy 
optimism introduces a potentially unintended consequence, as described in Sec-
tion II.C.3. That is, to imagine that nonstate actors are conferring democratic 
legitimacy through the consultation system by representing the interests of a 
broader civilian constituency is to recognize private sector groups as relevant ci-
vilian constituencies.
189
 Because status follows practice in international law, 
those private sector groups necessarily take their place among the “global pub-
lics” entitled to access to international officials.
190
 Thus, description matters: the 
strong legitimacy optimist account potentially extends expressive rights to inter-
national business, while the lobbying frame does not.
191
 
Finally, consider another potential analogy for nonstate actor access to inter-
national lawmakers: the notice-and-comment procedure in U.S. administrative 
law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Of these two regulatory 
analogies, lobbying better captures the freer-form features of the nonstate actor 
access structure. In a notice-and-comment procedure, actors offer comments 
within a structured process and then regulators are required to respond. In the 
international access structures, nonstate actors have opportunities to make com-
ments, but also to lobby on a more informal basis, and there is no response re-
quirement. Granted, contemporary administrative legal scholarship notes that a 
great deal of informal lobbying behavior also takes place outside of the formal-
ized notice-and-comment process.
192
 However, the notice-and-comment proce-
dure still reﬂects top-down attempts by administrative agencies to promulgate 
 
187. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 873-77 & n.98 (noting that after the so-called Battle in Seattle 
protests against the World Trade Organization in 1999, UN officials began to appreciate the 
fact that NGOs’ interests do not always align with UN interests; they then began to adopt 
critiques of NGO representativeness and discovered that some NGOs were simply “three peo-
ple and a fax” (quoting Justin Marozzi, Whose World Is It, Anyway?, SPECTATOR (Aug. 5, 
2000), at 15, who interviewed Fareed Zakaria, then Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs)). 
188. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 238-43. 
189. See supra Section II.C.3 for a more complete analysis of this point. 
190. Press Release, supra note 180. 
191. See supra Section II.C.3.  
192. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission 
Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 102 (2011) (“[I]n practice, notice-and-comment rulemaking 
may only be the tip of the iceberg in providing avenues for interest groups to inform agencies’ 
rulemaking projects.”). See generally William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of 
Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576 (2009) (studying 
“prenotice participation”—which takes place before the official notice-and-comment period—
by business and other interest groups). 
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particular rules, while the lobbying analogy captures the open-textured nature 
of relationships between lobbying groups and law- and policy-makers, to the 
point where outside groups may even—at times—drive the agenda of the organ-
ization they lobby. Moreover, a lobbying frame focuses reformers on salient fea-
tures of the access structures, as follows. 
B. The Lobbying Framework Invites Meaningful Reforms 
In offering a helpful descriptive analogy, the lobbying framework also lays 
groundwork for meaningful reforms. 
The lobbying framework helps vindicate the agenda of the moderate legiti-
macy optimists, who argue that input by outside groups has a number of sub-
stance and process beneﬁts and can often be quite helpful to lawmaking pro-
jects.
193
 The lobbying frame does not suggest that those contributions by outside 
actors should be eliminated, but that existing theory and practice is mismatched: 
access to officials and lawmakers through the accreditation regimes is mistaken 
for participation in the work of international organizations, with corresponding 
legitimating and democratizing beneﬁts. Moreover, this participation is imag-
ined to principally involve public interest organizations, rather than paid lobby-
ists. Both of these ﬂawed premises lead to ﬂawed regulations that both over- and 
under-restrict access to nonstate actors. The regulations neither offer the mean-
ingful quantum of participation that would allow nonstate actors to offer the 
substance and process goods the moderate legitimacy optimists imagine, nor do 
they adequately restrain against harms like undue inﬂuence and capture. 
Recognizing those ﬂaws allows reformers to choose between two more rea-
sonable options: regulating a pluralistic access regime like a lobbying regime, 
with regulation focusing on registration and disclosure; or creating multistake-
holder structures that embrace more robust participation by nonstate actors.
194
 
This argument builds on the work of those who advocate for enhanced mul-
tistakeholder structures,
195
 observe the beneﬁts of global legal pluralism, or seek 
greater opportunities for business participation in law production.
196
 For exam-
 
193. See, e.g., Durkee, supra note 118, at 291-97 (describing business roles in ensuring the success 
of the Cape Town Convention); Goode, supra note 123, at 606 (same); see also supra notes 10-
11 and accompanying text (describing recent literature on the role of nonstate actors in the 
development of international law). 
194. See, e.g., Abbott & Gartner, supra note 10, at 1-5, 25-35. 
195. Id. at 4. 
196. Id. 
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ple, Abbott and Gartner argue that nonstate actor participation in multistake-
holder structures can contribute to an institution’s credibility and ensure delib-
erative values like transparency, reason-giving, and consideration of a broader 
range of interests,
197
 without sacriﬁcing effective performance.
198
 
By contrast, many of the current access structures, including the ECOSOC 
structure, do not allow outside actors to engage in robust multistakeholder par-
ticipation in the production of law or policy. Rather, the access rules at ECOSOC 
and elsewhere maintain the primacy of states, preserving the classic hierarchy of 
state sovereignty and nonstate subordination. Characterizing these policies as 
lobbying rules clariﬁes that fundamental hierarchical relationship. The implica-
tions are instructive: if international officials and nation-state delegates seek to 
incorporate nonstate actor input in deeper ways, they must craft new regulatory 
structures to accomplish those goals. Otherwise, they can borrow from the 
toolbox of national-level lobbying regulations and guidelines to craft a more ad-
ministrable international lobbying regime. 
C. The Lobbying Framework Identiﬁes Pertinent Regulatory Tools 
The lobbying framework identiﬁes regulatory models for potential interna-
tional reforms. In particular, model regulations offered by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and watchdog groups, as 
well as lobbying regulations in the United States, focus on transparency and 
meaningful disclosure as the best regulatory response to lobbying activity. This 
discussion will begin with an examination of those models, and then turn to an 
explanation of some of the nuances and tensions in U.S. lobbying law that must 
be taken into account in any use of the U.S. model as a guiding frame. 
1. International Guidelines on Lobbying Regulation 
Guidelines issued by the OECD and democracy watchdog groups may serve 
as useful regulatory analogies for the international stage. 
International guidelines have been developed out of a perception that lobby-
ing is underregulated in national jurisdictions. According to a 2016 report by the 
Sunlight Foundation, a U.S. nonproﬁt focused on open government, only 
twenty countries other than the United States regulate lobbying.
199
 For obvious 
 
197. Id. passim. 
198. Id. at 32. 
199. Libby Watson, Inﬂuence Abroad: The State of Global Lobbying Disclosure, SUNLIGHT FOUND. 
(Nov. 30, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/11/30/inﬂuence-abroad-the 
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reasons, this list skews toward democracies, and the list includes just a smatter-
ing of countries from each continent: the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Lithuania, Georgia, Israel, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Australia, and 
Taiwan.
200
 The European Union itself also regulates lobbying, although only a 
few of its constituent states have domestic lobbying regulations.
201
 Remarkably, 
then, only ten percent of the world’s countries regulate lobbying. A 2013 report 
by the OECD conﬁrmed this dearth of lobbying regulation worldwide, stating 
that of the OECD’s thirty-ﬁve mostly economically advanced member countries, 
only twelve had “approved legislation and government regulations” regarding 
lobbying as of 2013, and some of the countries appearing on that list required 
only voluntary reporting.
202
 
Since national lobbying regulation on the whole appears to be underdevel-
oped, there is a push by the OECD and nonproﬁts like the Sunlight Foundation 
to encourage more countries to adopt robust lobbying regulations, especially be-
cause businesses now lobby transnationally. The OECD, for example, elaborated 
a set of guidelines recognizing that one of the obstacles that typically prevents 
countries from further regulating lobbying is the “complexity and sensitive na-
ture” of lobbying regulations, and that most existing reforms have developed 
responsively, in the wake of political scandals.
203
 At the same time, the OECD’s 
surveys of both lobbyists and legislators in OECD member countries show that 
both parties prefer disclosures in order to “alleviate actual or perceived problems 
of inappropriate inﬂuence peddling by lobbyists.”
204
 To this end, “the OECD re-
 
-state-of-global-lobbying-disclosure [http://perma.cc/T44U-QNTS]. The Sunlight Foun-
dation, which bills itself as a nonpartisan nonproﬁt that advocates globally for open govern-
ment, has undertaken extensive research on international lobbying laws. The group  
was founded by Michael Klein, a former partner at WilmerHale, and its advisory board in-
cludes Harvard’s Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler among others. Board & Advisors, 
 SUNLIGHT FOUND. (2017), http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/board [http://perma.cc
/75GP-W8HN]. The group also notably includes Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales and Craig 
Newmark of Craigslist. 
200. Watson, supra note 199. 
201. See id. 
202. Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2 (2013), http://
www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/Lobbying-Brochure.pdf [http://perma.cc/792P-NNSP] 
(listing Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, the 
United States, and, most recently, Austria and the Netherlands as the only countries with 
lobbying regulations). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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viewed data and experiences of government regulation, legislation and self-reg-
ulation of lobbyists” as well as “comparative reviews, country case studies and 
an analytical framework endorsed by governments” in order to develop “10 Prin-
ciples” of effective lobbying regulation, which it issued in 2009.
205
 
According to the OECD’s ﬁndings, effective lobbying regulation includes (a) 
unambiguous deﬁnitions of lobbyists and lobbying activities; (b) required dis-
closure about the objectives, beneﬁciaries, funding sources, and targets of lob-
bing activity; (c) rules regarding use of conﬁdential information, conﬂicts of in-
terest, and revolving-door incentives; (d) monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms; and (e) “a culture of integrity and transparency in daily practice 
through regular disclosure and auditing to ensure compliance.”
206
 
The OECD emphasizes that public officials should beneﬁt from the free ﬂow 
of information and allow all stakeholders, from the private sector to the public 
at large, fair and equitable access.
207
 It also presses for a clear deﬁnition of lob-
bying, and focuses on the importance of disclosures by lobbyists and a “publicly 
available register” where the public and all potential stakeholders (“including 
civil society organisations, businesses, the media and the general public”) can 
access lobbying disclosures and scrutinize lobbying activities.
208
 Additionally, 
the OECD emphasizes the importance of clear behavioral standards for lobbyists 
and officials alike with respect to revolving-door opportunities and the use of 
conﬁdential information.
209
 The OECD does not offer a model law for lobbying 
regulation, but instead stresses the importance of home-grown legal solutions. 
A group of civil society organizations including Transparency International 
and the Sunlight Foundation also put together their own guidelines for lobbying 
regulation in 2015, attempting to build on prior efforts by the OECD and existing 
regulations in national jurisdictions.
210
 These guidelines closely align with the 
 
205. Id. at 1. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 3 (“Public officials should preserve the beneﬁts of the free ﬂow of information and facil-
itate public engagement.”). 
208. Id. at 4. 
209. Id. (“In particular, they should cast no doubt on their impartiality to promote the public in-
terest, share only authorised information and not misuse ‘conﬁdential information,’ disclose 
relevant private interests and avoid conﬂict of interest . . . . Countries should consider estab-
lishing restrictions for public officials leaving office . . . .”). 
210. International Standards for Lobbying Regulation: Towards Greater Transparency, Integrity  
and Participation, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 3 (2015), http://lobbyingtransparency.net 
/lobbyingtransparency.pdf [http://perma.cc/54PY-SQU9]. 
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OECD recommendations in that they emphasize the transparency of the deci-
sion-making process through robust disclosure in a lobbying register,
211
 public 
access to the information,
212
 and adequate enforcement and sanctions.
213
 Like 
the OECD effort, the civil society effort also focused on clear codes of conduct 
for lobbyists and public officials.
214
 The civil society guidelines also recom-
mended open access to officials in order to achieve more balanced representation 
by a diversity of interests.
215
 However, the guidelines merely emphasized “open 
and fair access” and contained few concrete suggestions about how to achieve 
representational balance.
216
 Finally, like the OECD effort, the civil society guide-
lines refrained from offering model regulations, ostensibly to encourage regula-
tors to “address the particularities of the local context.”
217
 
Thus, lobbying regulations are underdeveloped outside of the United States, 
and reform efforts seek to protect open access and promote transparency. How-
ever, reformers have stopped short of providing model regulations that could 
serve as reference points for international lobbying regulations.  
2. U.S. Lobbying Law 
U.S. lobbying regulations are signiﬁcantly more robust than lobbying regu-
lations in much of the rest of the world, and so may serve as the most meaningful 
regulatory framework to guide international reforms.
218
 According to the Sun-
light Foundation report, the U.S. stands out in that it clearly deﬁnes lobbyists 
and lobbying activity, requires extensive disclosures, and then publishes those 
disclosures “in a searchable, sortable, exportable database on the Senate’s web-
site.”
219
 By contrast, only ﬁfteen other countries offer any online data about lob-
bying activity, and many fewer host a searchable database.
220
 While the United 
Kingdom appears to have a rigorous lobbying disclosure regime, it deﬁnes lob-
bying so narrowly as to capture only a fraction of potential lobbying activity in 
 
211. Id. at 6. 
212. Id. at 7. 
213. Id. at 12. 
214. Id. at 8. 
215. Id. at 5. 
216. Id. at 10. 
217. Id. at 13. 
218. This is the case even though lobbying activity has recently dramatically increased in countries 
such as England, Canada, and Australia. Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 268. 
219. Watson, supra note 199. 
220. Id. (noting that only six countries besides the United States host a searchable database). 
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those disclosures
221
—perhaps three percent.
222
 Because of the comparative ro-
bustness of the U.S. model, the following discussion will examine the U.S. ap-
proach in some detail.  
Regulatory tools used in the United States principally include sunlight rules 
requiring disclosures and registration.
223
 The 1946 Federal Regulation of Lob-
bying Act initially “imposed registration requirements for those who lobbied 
Congress, as well as a requirement of quarterly reports of money spent and re-
ceived for lobbying activities.”
224
 Forty years later, Congress passed the U.S. Lob-
bying Disclosure Act (LDA),
225
 which improved on the 1946 Act by expanding 
the scope of disclosure for lobbying activity, the list of who must register as a 
lobbyist, and what information must be disclosed.
226
 Yet the LDA faced criticism 
for being inaccessible and indecipherable to average citizens.
227
 Thus, Congress 
amended it in 2007 to further strengthen disclosure requirements and, signiﬁ-
cantly, to make data available for online searching.
228
 Also in 2007, inspired by 
the Jack Abramoff scandal, Congress passed the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act (HLOGA),
229
 which, among other things, “expanded disclo-
sure of lobbying coalitions,” introduced “a new reporting system for lobbyist 
contributions and disbursements,” and “improved public access to information 
disclosed under the LDA.”
230
 
In addition to the general registration and disclosure-based lobbying laws, 
the U.S. Congress has also sought to address undue inﬂuence and bribery. For 
 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. In an article surveying the ﬁeld just after the Citizens United decision, Richard Hasen compiled 
a useful history of lobbying regulation. Hasen, supra note 2, at 200-08. Hasen drew from 
William V. Luneburg et al.’s co-edited volume, The Lobbying Manual. See THE LOBBYING MAN-
UAL, supra note 1. 
224. Hasen, supra note 2, at 201. 
225. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codiﬁed as amended at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2012)); Hasen, supra note 2, at 201-02. 
226. Hasen, supra note 2, at 202. 
227. Id. (citing Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to 
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 520 (2007)). 
228. Id. at 202-03. 
229. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 
Stat. 735 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 2 and 18 U.S.C.). 
230. Thomas M. Susman & William V. Luneburg, History of Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals 
Since 1955, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 1, at 37. 
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example, the HLOGA attempted to reduce revolving-door pressures by extend-
ing the waiting period for senators to work as lobbyists,
231
 “required reports on 
lobbyists’ ‘bundling’ of campaign contributions,” and “banned gifts from lob-
byists to members of Congress and staffers.”
232
 Finally, Congress sought to en-
sure that lobbyists do not receive extra federal subsidies for engaging in lobbying 
activity by denying business income tax deductions for lobbying expenses and 
limiting lobbing activity by 501(c)(3) organizations.
233
 
Individual U.S. states have developed lobbying rules that share features with 
the federal system, though particular state rules vary widely.
234
 States have em-
ployed strategies such as banning campaign contributions or fundraising activi-
ties, banning contingency fee lobbying, or imposing provisions to prohibit re-
volving-door incentives.
235
 In addition, most states have lobbyist disclosure and 
registration requirements.
236
 
While the basis for lobbying rights in the United States is contested,
237
 the 
U.S. Supreme Court has addressed challenges to disclosure and tax laws with a 
First Amendment free speech analysis.
238
 It upheld the 1946 Act on the ground 
that legislators should be able to properly evaluate the “myriad pressures to 
which they are regularly subjected.”
239
 Thus, the Court “held that the state’s in-
 
231. Id. at 205. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 203. 
234. Trevor D. Dryer, Gaining Access: A State Lobbying Case Study, 23 J.L. & POL. 283, 285-86 (2007); 
id. at 293 n.28 (listing state lobbying laws). 
235. See id. at 285-86, 293; Ethics: Contingency Fees for Lobbyists, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-contingency-fees.aspx [http://perma
.cc/P86Z-V94Q]. 
236. Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right To 
Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 176 (1993) (“Forty-six states have mandated both reg-
istration and disclosure requirements for lobbyists, and one requires only registration.”). 
237. There is a debate within the United States about whether there is a constitutional right to 
lobby, but courts and scholars mostly agree that such a right is guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment’s Petition Clause. The Clause enshrines a citizen’s right to petition the government, and 
there is broad agreement that this extends to lobbying activity. This view, while embraced by 
courts, including the Supreme Court, is nevertheless contested. Recently, Maggie McKinley 
compiled a history of the Petition Clause in order to defend an argument that the Petition 
Clause protects a narrower set of activities than the “bundle” of practices regulated under fed-
eral lobbying laws. See McKinley, supra note 2. 
238. Hasen, supra note 2, at 209-12. 
239. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
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terest in providing information to legislators justiﬁed the disclosure require-
ments.”
240
 The Supreme Court has also noted the need for public conﬁdence in 
legislative integrity, noting that “[t]he activities of lobbyists who have direct ac-
cess to elected representatives, if undisclosed, may well present the appearance 
of corruption.”
241
 This latter justiﬁcation accords with rationales offered by Con-
gress in the legislative history of the LDA.
242
 
The U.S. lobbying framework is subject to a number of critiques. One ad-
dresses the sufficiency of disclosure as a means of regulation, which requires suf-
ﬁciently motivated watchdog groups to monitor the disclosures. Another notes 
the opaqueness of the lobbying process to outsiders.
243
 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and 
Yoav Hammer suggest remedying transparency failures and reducing monitor-
ing costs by drastically increasing required disclosures: for example by requiring 
lobbyists to publish online all written material transmitted to politicians and to 
list all areas of lobbying activity.
244
 Others suggest that the principal problem is 
unevenness in the lobbying capabilities of private-sector and public-interest 
groups. Reformers have proposed public funding to subsidize “lobbyists that 
represent diffuse, non-corporate interests,”
245
 as a means of “leveling up” or 
evening the playing ﬁeld.
246
 Maggie McKinley has proposed a reform of a First 
 
240. Hasen, supra note 2, at 209. 
241. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995); see also Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“[T]he Court has upheld registration and disclosure require-
ments on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”). 
242. The legislative history of the LDA focuses on “public awareness of lobbyist activities and pub-
lic conﬁdence,” Hasen, supra note 2, at 210, noting that “effective public disclosure of the iden-
tity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to inﬂuence federal officials in the conduct of 
Government actions will increase public conﬁdence in the integrity of Government,” id. (quot-
ing 2 U.S.C. § 1601(3) (2012)). These disclosure procedures are thus drawn from similar ra-
tionales as offered in campaign ﬁnance disclosure cases, which rest on principles of anticor-
ruption, appearance of corruption, and information interests. Elizabeth Garrett et al., 
Constitutional Issues Raised by the Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 
1, at 197, 201. 
243. See McKinley, supra note 2. 
244. Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 267. 
245. Dorie Appollonio et al., Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 48 (2008); see also Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the 
New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1165-67 (2011) (making a similar claim). 
246. Gerken, supra note 245, at 1166, 1168; Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 2, at 86-90; Hasen, 
supra note 2, at 208 (referencing Gerken for the idea of “leveling up”); see also Heidi Li Feld-
man, Toward an Ethics of Being Lobbied: Affirmative Obligations To Listen, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 493, 493 (2014) (asserting the ethical principle that “those in political office have af-
ﬁrmative obligations to seek out and listen to the widest and most diverse possible range of 
people” affected by a given regulation). 
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Amendment Petition Clause practice that has now fallen into desuetude, consist-
ing of clear rules and procedures by which members of the public can petition 
Congress.
247
 This ﬁx could entail something akin to a congressional Administra-
tive Procedure Act
248
 including “formal guidelines to make transparent and pre-
dictable the consideration [Congress] will afford” to petitions, and the require-
ment that all “lobbying” follow this formalized procedure.
249
 McKinley claims 
this would “allow professionalization of the representatives who represent the 
public in the formal petition process,”
250
 beneﬁt those clients pursuing public 
interests, and reduce the current “viliﬁ[cation]” of professional lobbyists.
251
 A 
number of scholars propose campaign ﬁnance reform to bolster current lobbying 
disclosure laws and curb potential undue inﬂuence. Reform proposals have sug-
gested additional bans on lobbyist fundraising or contributions to congressional 
election campaigns to avoid quid pro quo or “pay to play” arrangements.
252
 Fi-
nally, other reformers have targeted enforcement deﬁcits. The Sunlight Founda-
tion points to a large number of unregistered lobbyists and a lack of response by 
the Department of Justice.
253
 
Thus, U.S. lobbying rules are susceptible to an array of critiques. However, 
there is nevertheless evidence that the United States’ basic registration-plus-dis-
closure model represents global best practice at this time. The OECD’s and the 
Sunlight Foundation’s recommendations advocate for this approach, and most 
jurisdictions surveyed in the Sunlight Foundation study follow at least some of 
its basic elements. For example, due to the absence of domestic lobbying regula-
tions in EU member countries, the EU’s lobbying regulations took U.S. lobbying 
regulations as a guide. Over time, the EU lobbying framework has moved even 
closer to the U.S. approach by focusing particularly on transparency, open gov-
ernment, and accountability.
254
 One commentator notes that the two regulatory 
 
247. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1199-1200. 
248. Id. at 1199. 
249. Id. at 1200. 
250. Id. at 1201. 
251. Id. 
252. Hasen, supra note 2, at 208. 
253. Watson, supra note 199 (observing that “there are thousands of people in D.C. who are paid 
to inﬂuence public policy, but don’t register as lobbyists”). 
254. Liliana Mihut, Lobbying in the United States and the European Union: New Developments in Lob-
bying Regulation, 8 ROMANIAN J. EUR. AFF. 5, 14 (2008). 
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structures “have sprung from similar problems, and therefore have targeted sim-
ilar goals, in a world where globalization has diffused lobbying practices.”
255
 The 
European Commission’s speciﬁc strategy consists of a voluntary register for in-
terest representatives together with a binding code of conduct,
256
 while the Eu-
ropean Parliament instituted a mandatory register with full ﬁnancial disclo-
sure.
257
  
In conclusion, a reformer may query whether, in light of critiques of the reg-
istration-plus-disclosure model, those strategies should become a model for re-
forms at international organizations. However, these criticisms appear to point 
more to the challenge inherent in regulating lobbying activity than to the partic-
ular shortcomings of this regulatory approach. 
3. Applying the Lobbying Regulatory Analogy 
Lobbying regulation in the U.S.—as an example of global best practice—is 
relevant to regulation of international lobbying activity by identifying the fol-
lowing principles. 
First, the principal regulatory tools to address lobbying activity are the reg-
istration of lobbyists and the disclosure of lobbying activity. The rationale for 
these regulatory strategies is not well established in the United States, but pro-
posed explanations include: (a) protection of the legislator’s capacity to evaluate 
the nature and origin of the pressures to which they are subjected; and (b) pro-
tection of the public’s conﬁdence in legislative integrity and reduction of the ap-
pearance of corruption. Both of these public interests are balanced in the United 
States against First Amendment free speech rights (and potentially First Amend-
ment Petition Clause rights), so lobbying cannot be entirely restricted. Moreo-
ver, banning lobbying may impinge on the public interest in gathering the views 
of constituents and the expertise of experts. 
The U.S. approach does not select particular kinds of groups for lobbying 
activity as do the international access rules. U.S. tax rules that prohibit 501(c)(3) 
charitable organizations from participating in lobbying activity do not separate 
for-proﬁt from non-proﬁt organizations in the way that the international system 
does. Rather, the U.S. tax system makes this distinction in order to even the 
playing ﬁeld by regulating all entrants equally. The purpose of the tax rule is to 
 
255. Id. Nevertheless, some differences in approach remain. Europe retains corporatist traditions 
where unions, employer associations, and public officials engage in dialogue, resulting in a 
less robust tradition of lobbying and less stringent regulatory requirements. See id. 
256. Id. There is a particular inducement for representatives to register: those who do are alerted 
to opportunities to comment on speciﬁc areas of interest. Id. 
257. Id. One of the EU leaders responsible for launching and implementing the EU register focused 
speciﬁcally on the similarities between the EU regulations and those of the United States. Id. 
international lobbying law 
1797 
ensure that tax-exempt organizations do not receive a subsidy for participating 
in lobbying activities. In short, the U.S. approach focuses on individual rights to 
lobby, beneﬁts accruing to lawmakers when they hear from the public, and the 
transparency of that process.  
Many elements of the U.S. domestic lobbying model apply well in the inter-
national context. Speciﬁcally, international lobbying regulations should focus on 
protecting a lawmaker’s capacity to evaluate the nature and origin of the pres-
sures to which they are subjected, protecting the public’s conﬁdence in the law-
making process, and allowing third-party watchdog groups to monitor lobbying 
activity and bring it to the attention of relevant lawmakers or decisionmakers. 
Registration and disclosure rules do not cut against an international organiza-
tion’s capacity to gather the diverse nonstate views and the expertise of experts. 
Signiﬁcantly, the lobbying framework offers no basis to maintain archaic, path-
dependent distinctions between for-proﬁts and nonproﬁts that have become 
meaningless in light of trade association and industry association lobbying ac-
tivity. The framework also gives no reason to maintain a procedure that requires 
“purposes and principles” in concert with the UN’s own, as the point is not to 
administer an ex ante merit test, but rather to clarify the identities and intentions 
of the diversity of groups that seek to offer input.  
D. Caveats and Limitations 
The beneﬁts of the lobbying framework in the international context are that 
it better describes the actors, regulations, and activities of the access regimes in 
international organizations like ECOSOC; that by doing so it clears out outdated 
assumptions and makes room for meaningful reforms; and that it offers poten-
tial regulatory tools to structure these reforms. However, there are a number of 
limitations and potential objections to the lobbying analysis. I will take them in 
turn. 
First, the access rights offered by international organizations do not map on 
perfectly to lobbying rights, and the behavior of NGOs does not exactly mirror 
that of lobbyists in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, lob-
bying is understood as “an amalgam of a broad range of advocacy practices,”
258
 
which include both informal and formal practices. Formal practices in the United 
States are largely analogous to those on the international stage, as these include 
appearing before Congress and submitting written comments, as well as engag-
ing informally with members of Congress. But U.S. domestic practice diverges 
in that it includes signiﬁcant elements of campaign ﬁnance and other quid pro 
quo arrangements. I have ascertained no evidence of these latter arrangements 
 
258. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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internationally, and so campaign ﬁnance rules and tax law rules in the United 
States do not have parallel applicability internationally. 
However, the fact that not all regulatory tools used to respond to lobbying 
activity in the United States and elsewhere are translatable to the international 
context should not detract from the thrust of the argument. The point is not to 
suggest an exact replication of U.S. regulatory strategies internationally, but in-
stead to discern broad regulatory principles that characterize governmental re-
sponses to lobbying activity, and to suggest that those principles may be of use 
internationally.
259
 
Second, as considered brieﬂy in the previous Section, U.S. lobbying rules are 
susceptible to critiques regarding under-enforcement and the limited utility of 
disclosure. Nevertheless, as indicated above, these criticisms are less about the 
regulatory approach itself than about challenges of regulating lobbying activity.  
Finally, a lobbying frame carries a strong pejorative connotation in the 
United States and abroad. As Maggie McKinley has noted, many Americans 
“hold lobbyists in incredibly low regard,” “decry lobbying as rent seeking and a 
corruption of the democratic process,” and believe that “more must be done to 
regulate lobbying.”
260
 Richard Hasen points out that “[i]n difficult times like 
 
259. As previously mentioned, an alternative theoretical candidate to the lobbying frame is the no-
tice-and-comment model drawn from U.S. domestic practice pursuant to the APA. But the 
notice-and-comment process in the United States appears to diverge from the international 
context in that it functions through a structured, top-down process. In practice, “off-the-rec-
ord communications between government officials and private parties” do regularly occur. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-63 (1985) 
(considering whether the APA prohibits or at least requires disclosure of such contacts). In 
fact, studies in administrative law show that lobbying is a pervasive force in the U.S. regula-
tory context despite the seemingly restrictive procedural restraints of the APA. See, e.g., 
Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1321, 1365-66 (2010) (observing that while the APA “does require communications between 
agencies and stakeholders to take place in the sunlight, . . . [b]oth before and after this trans-
parent process . . . stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory policies in the shad-
ows”); Wagner et al., supra note 192, at 102 (“[I]n practice, notice-and-comment rulemaking 
may only be the tip of the iceberg in providing avenues for interest groups to inform agencies’ 
rulemaking projects.”). But recent reforms have not moderated or meaningfully structured 
this activity. See, e.g., Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda 
Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2012) 
(using empirical data to analyze signiﬁcance of lobbying in the pre-proposal stage of rule-
making). So, in short, the notice-and-comment frame neither cleanly ﬁts the facts nor offers 
meaningful reforms. 
260. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1156-58; see also Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 265 (not-
ing that some “deﬁn[e] lobbying by interest groups as ‘the most serious and worrisome prob-
lem of American democracy’” (quoting GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 25 (1965))). 
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these, when people are looking for someone to blame for a ﬁnancial meltdown, 
[or] a failing health care system . . . lobbyists are a convenient target.”
261
 Distaste 
for lobbying extends beyond the United States. A recent European Parliament 
working paper suggested, with a degree of reserve, that “it should also be men-
tioned that the term ‘lobbyist’ still carries a rather negative meaning in a number 
of other Community languages.”
262
 Part of the problem is that lobbying—a no-
toriously difficult term to deﬁne
263
—often implies more than offering sugges-
tions to lawmakers and also connotes nefarious activities like bribery and cap-
ture. A working paper from the European Parliament acknowledged the 
ambiguity of the term: 
[O]ne advantage of using the term “lobbyist” is that, even though it is 
often shunned in some countries and associated with the United States 
“pork barrel” system, it is widely understood and the functions of the 
lobbyist are more clearly recognised than other terms such as “govern-
ment relations,” “public affairs” or “special interest groups.”
264
 
The suggestion to transport the lobbying framework to the international 
context is not meant to carry the implicit critique that international access re-
gimes are plagued by inappropriate inﬂuences. Yet international organizations 
may be reticent to adopt the lobbying frame given the apparent strength of its 
pejorative connotations. 
As foreshadowed at the beginning of this Article, the Article’s analysis show-
cases a strange dichotomy: while commentators evaluating international access 
structures have regarded them with outsized optimism, commentators who eval-
uate lobbying regulation in the United States and elsewhere seem to express an 
outsized cynicism about the law and practice of lobbying. Perhaps this is partially 
a matter of semantics. This Article’s analysis suggests that both reactions may be 
too extreme. The theory and practice of lobbying regulation might be better un-
derstood as a ﬂawed but useful means to understand and govern public partici-
pation in governance. 
*** 
 
261. Hasen, supra note 2, at 194. 
262. Wilhelm Lehmann, Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices 2 (European 
Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for Research, Working Paper, 2003). 
263. See, e.g., id. (“If lobbying essentially describes the direct advocacy of a point of view about a 
matter of public policy, it is less clear as a description of the actual work undertaken by most 
people in the lobbying industry.”). 
264. Id. 
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At bottom, the purpose of the lobbying analogy is to highlight the descriptive 
fact that interest group lobbying is an international as well as domestic phenom-
enon; to reframe this international activity as interest group lobbying, rather 
than multistakeholder membership in global governance, as strong legitimacy 
optimism has long asserted; and to borrow useful regulatory tools vertically 
across jurisdictions from the domestic to the international. 
iv. international lobbying law: a typology 
Drawing on the lobbying framework developed in Part III, this Part proposes 
a typology of access structures across international organizations affiliated with 
the United Nations. The account is stylized, but the simplicity is useful: it helps 
identify common features within a heterogeneous set of consultation rules and 
organize the prescriptive points offered in Part III. 
Signiﬁcantly, the typology clariﬁes a set of tradeoffs that the lobbying analy-
sis produces: officials can either embrace the lobbying frame as an organizing 
principle for reform and focus on regulatory tools like registration and disclo-
sure; or they can take another route entirely, building multistakeholder struc-
tures that welcome a smaller group of nonstate participants as full voting mem-
bers. These two choices offer distinct tradeoffs. But I hypothesize that either has 
the potential to better satisfy an organization’s goals with respect to nonstate 
participation than the most common middle-ground approach. As the following 
discussion suggests, that middle-ground approach is premised on the strong le-
gitimacy optimism theory critiqued in this analysis, and also is the source of 
many of the practical problems outlined in prior Parts. 
A. The Lobbying Rules Map 
The access structures at international organizations have a variety of com-
mon features. Mapping these features along two spectra produces useful ideal 
types. Those types organize recurring features of the access rules and facilitate 
exploration of the reform hypotheses this Part will propose. 
To be sure, the typology by necessity cannot capture a great degree of variety 
among the access structures. Nevertheless, the schema isolates meaningful sim-
ilarities and variations, particularly as they pertain to private-sector lobbying. In 
particular, nearly half of the UN organizations maintain regulatory structures 
closely patterned on ECOSOC’s in the following respects: they have established 
an accreditation system for NGOs, require nonproﬁt status (and thus exclude 
individual businesses), and yet include business-promoting NGOs (such as in-
dustry and trade associations) on equal terms as other NGOs. The variations 
from this standard access structure principally stretch along two dimensions. 
international lobbying law 
1801 
First, along a horizontal spectrum lie the degrees of regulatory control the 
organization exercises over the types of entities that are permitted access to it. Of 
course, since the analysis focuses on nongovernmental entities, this spectrum 
does not include membership rules for state entities. On one end of the spectrum 
are access rules that accept all would-be participants in the process. On the other 
end are the rules that divide organizations into categories, with different access 
rules applicable to each. 
Second, along a vertical spectrum lie the degrees of opportunity for nongov-
ernmental entities to shape an organization’s decisional process. For example, at the 
top of this vertical spectrum lie international organizations that offer only access, 
including limited persuasive rights like submission of position papers in a care-
fully regulated process, informal lobbying opportunities, and perhaps receipt of 
bulletins and other information. At the bottom end are consultation structures 
that welcome nonstate groups as full voting members in the process or otherwise 
formalize and elevate nonstate input in the ultimate regulatory rules. Toward the 
middle of this second spectrum are access structures that permit a form of par-
ticipation more robust than mere access but short of full voting membership. 
Organizations in this middle group may offer participation in discussions lead-
ing to consensus decision making, for example. 
The two spectra identify a set of regulatory ideal types, as follow: 
TABLE 1. 
 Less Categorical  More Categorical 
Access Generalist Classic Moderate Classic Specialist Classic 
Participation 
 
  
Membership Generalist Innovator Moderate Innovator Specialist Innovator 
 
Structures at the top of the vertical spectrum I call “classics” whereas those 
at the bottom are “innovators.” This is not to say that structures at the top were 
necessarily developed earlier in time than the others. Rather, classic structures 
hew to classic legal understandings about the relative statuses of nation-states 
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and nonstate actors.
265
 Structures at the bottom innovate by disrupting those 
classic international legal understandings. They offer more access to nonstate 
entities and spread authority beyond nation-state delegates. They dispense with 
the bare consultation structure and incorporate more nonstate authority over the 
end result through voting or participation in a consensus procedure. Of course, 
there is room all along this spectrum, with some organizations falling into a mid-
dle zone between classic and innovator. 
Another set of observations may be made about the location of an organiza-
tion along the horizontal spectrum. I will call organizations toward the left “gen-
eralist,” and toward the right “specialist.” Generalist organizations accept all en-
trants on equal terms. Specialist structures have restricted access criteria, giving 
access to only certain kinds of groups or making many distinctions between 
kinds of groups and offering different access rights. Thus, we have “generalist 
classics” in the top left corner, “specialist innovators” in the bottom right corner, 
and so on. 
To reiterate, organizing the access rules in this manner reduces spectra to 
simpliﬁed ideal types. Mapping all UN-affiliated organizations according to 
more precise locations on the intersecting spectra would produce a scatter dia-
gram, rather than a typology. 
As a descriptive matter, I propose that each of the locations on the map rep-
resents a set of tradeoffs: between maintaining administrability and balancing 
nonstate inputs; between preserving state sovereignty and capturing robust 
nonstate expertise and engagement; between openness and selectiveness. I the-
orize that organizations should choose their point on the lobbying rules map 
according to their distinctive organizational goals. While it appears that over 
time there has been a rightward drift along the horizontal spectrum, from or-
ganizations that make fewer distinctions among organizations to those who 
make more (from generalist to specialist), I hypothesize that organizations have 
not been able to reap the beneﬁts they may have hoped to reap from that move-
ment because they have not made a corresponding movement down the vertical 
 
265. According to this view, nation-states are sovereign and possess the capacity to determine their 
own fates, so they are the only actors that may make law for themselves. Nations may some-
times delegate their lawmaking authority to international organizations; but nonstate entities 
have no capacity to make international law. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE 341 (1905) (“Since the Law of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, 
States only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”); see also JAN KLABBERS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 53–73 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing the-
ories that institutions with lawmaking and adjudicatory powers derive their authority either 
from an initial act of express delegation or from implied powers); Duncan B. Hollis, Why 
State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International 
Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 146–71 (2005) (describing international lawmaking powers 
by nonstate actors pursuant to delegations of authority from states). 
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spectrum (toward specialist innovator). These observations underpin my pro-
posal that organizations should consider strategies that leave them in the far top 
left corner (generalist classic) or bottom right (specialist innovator), and eschew 
middle-of-the-map solutions. 
To pave the way for that discussion, the following table shows how the ideal 
types might be replaced by consultation structures at a number of international 
organizations. The examples are far from exhaustive. Rather, they are selected to 
capture the diversity of structures that exist: 
TABLE 2. 
 Less Categorical  More Categorical 
Access 
IMF 
(Cf. U.S. APA Notice & 
Comment procedure) 
ECOSOC 
Codex 
(Most Populated Area) 
WHO 
FAO 
Participation  UNCITRAL UNAids 
Membership (Null set)  
ILO 
GAVI 
UN Women 
1. The ECOSOC Structure and Its Progeny Are Moderate Classics 
UN-affiliated organizations typically fall into the “moderate classic” portion 
of the rules map. The cluster is largely due to many international organizations’ 
reliance on ECOSOC’s structure as a starting point for regulatory design. 
As for the horizontal spectrum, the ECOSOC rules do not accept all potential 
participants, but rather have some sort of access criteria and screening or appli-
cation mechanism. This is, I submit, a direct result of the eminence of strong 
legitimacy optimism as a normative basis for regulatory design. Over time, the 
ECOSOC rules were amended and reformed in an attempt to make divisions 
between associations to achieve a representative set of “consultants,” gradually 
moving the ECOSOC rules along the horizontal spectrum from left to right and 
into the moderate category over time. Thus, the ECOSOC rules now have a gate-
keeping structure that requires potential lobbyists to apply for accreditation. 
Only some groups can obtain this status. Notably, individuals and for-proﬁt or-
ganizations are excluded, along with any organization that cannot assert “aims 
and purposes” that support the UN’s work and demonstrate that it has internal 
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governance structures that make it accountable to its membership.
266
 Rather 
than simply offering comments on an ad hoc basis, consultants must prepare an 
application and be voted in by a nineteen-member NGO committee. Most must 
then provide quadrennial reports to maintain their accreditation status and cor-
responding access. 
ECOSOC rules fall at the top of the vertical scale and thus are “classic” be-
cause they hew to a classic state/nonstate hierarchy of authority. The impact a 
nonstate entity can have over the rulemaking process is limited to receiving in-
formation and exercising various forms of persuasion such as offering written or 
oral comments or informally buttonholing delegates outside of meeting rooms. 
Lobbying groups do not, for example, participate in decision making, voting, 
forming a consensus, or otherwise adopting rules. In addition, consultants are 
organized into various tiers corresponding to the breadth of scope of their mis-
sion, with organizations given more or less expansive access rights depending on 
their accreditation tier. ECOSOC is not classiﬁed as a “specialist” organization in 
this analysis because its accreditation forms a very broad tent. Many different 
kinds of associations make up the approximately ﬁve thousand that currently 
hold accreditation, from small groups of grassroots activists to familiar NGO 
mega-groups like Amnesty International, to academic and professional associa-
tions like the American Society of International Law and, as is particularly rele-
vant to this project, to industry and trade associations who lobby on behalf of 
for-proﬁt entities. 
The Codex Alimentarius (Codex) is an illuminating example of the domi-
nance of the moderate classic access rules for two reasons. First, the organization 
has received some scholarly attention as an outlier in terms of its nonstate access 
rules, but nevertheless still falls into the well-established and relatively common 
“moderate classic” category. Second, unlike a number of other organizations in-
cluding ECOSOC, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), and WHO, the Codex’s access structure was not originally 
authorized in a charter provision but instead from separately adopted rules of 
procedure; yet in practice the rules end up preserving the moderate classic 
norm.
267
 
 
266. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, ¶¶ 2–12 (prescribing that a consult-
ant organization must have, inter alia, a democratically adopted constitution, representative 
process of governance, and authorized representatives who speak for the organization’s mem-
bership). 
267. Procedural Manual, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N 16-17 (1st ed. 1968), ftp://ftp.fao.org/co-
dex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_01e.pdf; cf. Procedural Manual, CODEX ALIMEN-
TARIUS COMM’N 237-48 (25th ed. 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5995e.pdf [http://perma.cc
/WA32-58GW]. 
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Codex was established jointly by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the WHO in 1962,
268
 and later adopted Rules of Procedure elaborat-
ing access rules which grant “observer” status to nonstate entities. That status is 
available automatically to NGOs with relationships with Codex’s founding or-
ganizations (the FAO and WHO),
269
 and to other NGOs that apply to the Sec-
retary of the Commission and meet criteria which closely follow the ECOSOC 
blueprint.
270
 An eligible NGO must, inter alia: (1) be international in structure 
and scope of activity, and representative of the specialized ﬁeld of interest in 
which it operates; (2) be concerned with matters covering a part or all of the 
Commission’s ﬁeld of activity; (3) have aims and purposes that conform to the 
Commission’s objectives; and (4) have a representative leadership structure that 
is responsive to its membership.
271
 The FAO and WHO make ﬁnal determina-
tions about whether to grant observer status at Codex,
272
 which 147 NGOs have 
 
268. Notably, the conference that established Codex was attended by representatives of forty-four 
member countries of the FAO and WHO as well as by observers from fourteen NGOs, in-
cluding a variety of trade associations (e.g., the Federation of Margarine Associations, the In-
ternational Office of Cocoa and Chocolate, and the International Dairy Federation). See Report 
on Joint FAO/ WHO Conference on Food Standards, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N 36 (Oct. 
1962), http://www.fao.org/input/download/report/715/al62_08e.pdf [http://perma.cc
/QX8G-BHKM]. 
269. Id. Observer status is also possible for nonmember nations and other intergovernmental or-
ganizations. Id. 
270. The application requests information on the aims and subjects of the organization, structure 
of the organization, meetings concerned with matters covering the Commission’s ﬁeld of ac-
tivity, relations with other international organizations, expected contributions to the Com-
mission, past activities in relation to Codex, and an indication of the source of funding. Infor-
mation Required from International Non-Governmental Organizations Requesting “Observer 
Status,” CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fao.org/fao-who 
-codexalimentarius/members-observers/ngo-participation/en [http://perma.cc/DU89 
-PSHH]. 
271. Finally, the organization must have been established for at least three years prior to applying 
for observer status. Principles Concerning the Participation of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the Work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 
COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Principles Concerning Participation], http://www.fao.org
/fao-who-codexalimentarius/members-observers/ngo-participation/en [http://perma.cc
/DU89-PSHH]. Through its collaboration with international NGOs, Codex seeks “expert in-
formation, advice and assistance from international non-governmental organizations and to 
enable organizations which represent important sections of public opinion . . . to express the 
views of their members and to play an appropriate role in ensuring the harmonizing of inter-
sectoral interests.” Id. 
272. Id. 
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currently obtained.
273
 Of these, approximately sixty, or just over one-third, are 
associations representing a speciﬁc trade or industry, including organizations 
such as the European Potato Trade Association, International Chewing Gum As-
sociation, and International Frozen Foods Association.
274
 
Thus, although Codex has been hailed as an example of innovation because 
of the presence of so many private-sector groups, the access rules in fact are not 
structurally different from the mainstream. The Codex structure is moderate in 
that, like ECOSOC, it does not accept all potential participants, but only partic-
ipants with particular governance structures and interests. Codex has a classic 
consultation structure because, just like ECOSOC, NGOs with observer status 
enjoy a range of privileges including informational and consultation privileges, 
but no full membership or voting privileges. These NGOs may send an observer 
to sessions of the Commission and subsidiary bodies; receive working docu-
ments and discussion papers from the Secretary of the Commission; circulate to 
the Commission views in writing; and participate in discussions when invited 
by the Chairperson.
275
 The fact that Codex has received attention as an innovator 
may perhaps simply be a result of the fact that private-sector access has been 
underappreciated in other international organizations. 
2. Reforms Have Produced More Specialist Structures 
A number of international organizations have deviated from ECOSOC’s ap-
proach due to perceived shortcomings, such as too much access, too little regu-
lation, lack of administrability by overburdened gatekeepers, and the potential 
capture of officials in sensitive matters of public policy like global health.
276
 
For example, the WHO has an accreditation system quite explicitly modeled 
on ECOSOC’s. In fact, the WHO Constitution has a parallel Article 71 that states, 
nearly identically to the UN Charter’s Article 71, that the WHO “may, on matters 
 
273. Codex Observers, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fao.org/fao 
-who-codexalimentarius/members-observers/observers/en [http://perma.cc/J5SK 
-W7WH]. 
274. Id. 
275. NGOs may also be invited by the Directors-General to participate in, and submit views in 
writing to, meetings or seminars on subjects organized by the FAO/WHO Standards Pro-
gramme. Observers also receive documentation and information about planned meetings 
agreed upon with the Secretariat. Principles Concerning Participation, supra note 271. 
276. See, e.g., Ayelet Berman, Industry, Regulatory Capture and Transnational Standard Setting, 111 
AJIL UNBOUND 112, 113-15 (2017) (discussing the risk of regulatory capture in transnational 
standard setting and regulation and offering several examples of WHO capture). 
international lobbying law 
1807 
within its competence, make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-op-
eration with non-governmental international organizations and . . . with na-
tional organizations, governmental or non-governmental.”
277
 Notably, the 
WHO Constitution retains both the “non-governmental organizations” lan-
guage as well as language authorizing “suitable arrangements for consultation” 
from the UN Charter’s parallel Article 71. The WHO provision diverges only in 
that it includes the word “co-operation,” potentially authorizing a broader scope 
of consultation rights for nonstate actors. This explicit borrowing of the UN 
Charter language is unsurprising in light of the fact that the WHO Constitution 
was negotiated just a month after the UN Charter was signed in June 1946. 
Over time, however, the practices of the two organizations have diverged. In 
May 2016, the World Health Assembly adopted a new Framework of Engage-
ment for the WHO’s interactions with nonstate actors.
278
 Notably, the Frame-
work erects a separate set of rules for “private sector entities” and “international 
business associations” than for “nongovernmental organizations,”
279
 with addi-
tional safeguards in place for engagement with the private sector.
280
 The Frame-
work’s safeguards are meant to guard against conﬂicts of interest that might have 
negative impacts on the “WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and repu-
tation; and public health mandate.”
281
 This distinction between the two groups 
responds to the WHO’s embattled history with private-sector inﬂuences.
282
 
The WHO’s experience with tobacco association inﬁltration in fact demon-
strates the potential risks of degradation of information value that ﬂow from 
private-sector group participation when conﬂicts of interest between an interna-
tional organization’s agenda and private-sector agendas arise. Philip Morris and 
others engaged in “an elaborate, well ﬁnanced, sophisticated, and usually invis-
ible” campaign to discredit and impede the WHO, “hid[ing] behind a variety of 
ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy, and business organiza-
 
277. WHO CONST. art. 71. The constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference 
held in New York from June 19 to July 22, 1946, signed on July 22, 1946 by the representatives 
of sixty-one states, and entered into force on April 7, 1948. Id. at 1 n.1; see United Nations 
World Health Organization Interim Commission, Summary Report on Proceedings, Minutes, 
and Final Acts of the International Health Conference, Held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 
1946, in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 99 (1948). 
278. WHO, Framework, supra note 16. 
279. Id. at Annex, ¶ 10. 
280. Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 13, 45. 
281. Id. at Annex, ¶ 7(c). 
282. See, e.g., TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES, supra note 99. The committee authoring this report 
was convened by the WHO Director-General. Id. at ii. 
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tions,” including “trade unions, tobacco company-created front groups and to-
bacco companies’ own affiliated food companies.”
283
 As one example among 
many, the International Tobacco Growers’ Association, a private-sector associa-
tion that originally represented a small group of tobacco farmers, came to be 
controlled by the larger tobacco industry in order to serve as a “front for [their] 
third world lobby activities at WHO,” meant speciﬁcally to “undermine WHO 
tobacco control activities.”
284
 To avoid a repeat of these negative experiences in 
the new Framework, the WHO articulated a policy change: the WHO would no 
longer “engage with the tobacco industry,” the arms industry, or any nonstate 
actors that advance those industries’ work.
285
 And it would “exercise particular 
caution” when engaging with other entities whose policies or activities are “neg-
atively affecting human health and are not in line with WHO’s policies, norms 
and standards.”
286
 
To carry out these new policies, the Framework broadly deﬁnes “private sec-
tor entity” to include commercial enterprises as well as “international business 
associations . . . that do not intend to make a proﬁt for themselves but represent 
the interests of their members, which are commercial enterprises.”
287
 In addition, 
the category includes other entities or associations that are not sufficiently inde-
pendent from their commercial sponsors. The WHO takes upon itself the task 
of determining if an entity should be categorized as a private-sector entity due 
to the fact that it is the recipient of “undue inﬂuence” from commercial entities 
through ﬁnancing, participation in decision making, or otherwise.
288
 For exam-
ple, other NGOs, philanthropic foundations, or academic institutions may be 
categorized as private-sector entities and thus also be subject to the WHO’s new 
provisions on engagement with this type of entity.
289
 In order to equip its gate-
keepers with sufficient information to determine which entities might have such 
private-sector relationships, all would-be consultant organizations are required 
to provide detailed information on their membership, legal status, objectives, 
governance structure, assets, income and funding sources, affiliations, webpage, 
and other data so that the WHO can conduct its own due diligence.
290
 The 
 
283. Id. at iii, 3-5. 
284. Id. at 47-48. 
285. WHO, Framework, supra note 16, at Annex, ¶ 44. 
286. Id. at Annex, ¶ 45. 
287. Id. at Annex, ¶ 10. 
288. Id. at Annex, ¶ 13. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at Annex, ¶ 39. 
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WHO’s due diligence process is explicitly aimed at determining why an organi-
zation seeks access and what interests it may have.
291
 Along with the Framework, 
the WHO established an electronic tool for managing engagement that contains 
a register of nonstate actors and identiﬁcation of potential conﬂicts of interest.
292
 
The WHO’s innovative reform ﬂows from an ex ante normative judgment 
about the beneﬁts and risks that attach to private-sector participation. But, as 
the discussion in Section II.C.2 noted, this reform may prove to be unsuccess-
ful,
293
 overburdening already taxed gatekeepers
294
 and offering no realistic 
means to respond to the fact that NGOs often have close links and partnerships 
with the corporate world.
295
 
To return to the lobbying rules map, the WHO’s recent reforms have driven 
it to the right, toward specialist classic. The access rules are now specialist because 
they regulate different nongovernmental entities differently, attempting to erect 
separate inﬂuence pipelines for public-interest NGOs on the one hand and, on 
the other, for private-sector entities and any other entities that might be unduly 
inﬂuenced by those private-sector entities. They are classic because, like 
ECOSOC, they offer nonstate entities mere access, rather than membership or 
deep participation in government. 
Like the WHO, the FAO is a specialist because it distinguishes between pub-
lic-interest NGOs and private-sector entities. Like the WHO, the FAO was es-
tablished in 1945
296
 and has a long history of engaging with external entities.
297
 
 
291. Id. at Annex, ¶ 31 (stating that the objective is to “clarify the interest and objectives of the 
entity in engaging with WHO and what it expects in return”). 
292. Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 21, 38; see also WHO Register of Non-State Actors, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/about/collaborations/non-state-actors/register [http://perma.cc
/DV88-CEPD]. 
293. See Durkee, supra note 14, at 206-07. 
294. Id. at 205. 
295. See id. at 253-54. 
296. About FAO, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/about/en 
[http://perma.cc/6KAA-77A4]. The organization’s goals are “the eradication of hunger, food 
insecurity and malnutrition; the elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic 
and social progress for all; and the sustainable management and utilization of natural re-
sources.” Id. The FAO now has 194 member nations, two associate members, and one member 
organization—the European Union. Membership of FAO, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/legal/home/membership-of-fao/en [http://perma.cc/33KK 
-8YKN]. 
297. FAO Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 1 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3443e/i3443e.pdf [http://perma
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The FAO now deﬁnes the organizations that are eligible for access as “Civil So-
ciety Organizations” (CSOs), which are “those non-state actors that work in the 
areas related to FAO’s mandate.”
298
 These include member-based organizations, 
NGOs, and social movements.
299
 Unlike the WHO, the FAO explicitly excludes 
private-sector entities.
300
 Beyond the distinction between CSOs and private-sec-
tor entities, the FAO’s access structure is fairly traditional. CSOs have two main 
avenues through which to engage with the FAO: formal accreditation and infor-
mal collaboration. As for accreditation, as with ECOSOC,
301
 qualiﬁed interna-
tional NGOs may apply for and obtain one of three potential types of formal 
status—consultative, specialized consultative, or liaison status—based on the 
importance of the CSO’s work to the activities of the FAO.
302
 To obtain any of 
these types of formal status, CSOs must meet representational criteria, possess 
“aims and purposes” in accordance with the FAO’s work, and demonstrate suf-
ﬁcient accountability to the CSO’s membership through a formal governance 
structure.
303
 Unlike at ECOSOC, at the FAO, formal status will not be consid-
ered until a CSO has cooperated with the FAO at a technical level during at least 
a two-year period.
304
 
The FAO has also recently instituted reforms with respect to its relationships 
with the private sector. In 2013 and 2015 documents, the FAO articulated rules in 
which the private sector is deﬁned as “all sectors of the food, agriculture, forestry 
and ﬁsheries systems—from production to consumption—and all sizes of enter-
prise . . . as well as related trade, ﬁnancial and other service organizations.”
305
 In 
 
.cc/WT7T-77RJ] (“Only through effective collaboration with governments, civil society, pri-
vate sector, academia, research centres and cooperatives, and making use of each other’s 
knowledge and comparative advantages, can food insecurity be defeated.”). 
298. Id. at 3. 
299. Id. at 17. 
300. Id. at 8 (“In principle, food producer organizations will fall under the private sector strategy, 
unless they state otherwise and comply with the criteria for CSOs.”). 
301. See supra Section I.A. 
302. 2 Basic Texts of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FOOD AND AGRIC. 
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS § M, ¶¶ 2, 6-8 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-mp046e.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8KVY-TCCB]. 
303. Id. at § M, ¶¶ 6-8. 
304. Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao
.org/partnerships/civil-society/faq/en [http://perma.cc/T3MX-X4B6]. 
305. Principles and Guidelines for FAO Cooperation with the Private Sector, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (2000), http://www.fao.org/3/a-x2215e.pdf [http://perma.cc/HC2X
-5ZZJ] (emphasis omitted); see also FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector, FOOD 
& AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 13 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3444e
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a marked divergence from the ECOSOC norm, the FAO’s deﬁnition of for-proﬁt 
enterprises also includes “enterprises, companies or businesses . . . private ﬁnan-
cial institutions; industry and trade associations; and consortia that represent 
private sector interests.”
306
 Private-sector entities may not be granted formal sta-
tus or accreditation, but may engage in less formalized ways.
307
 
Finally, another organization that has moved to the right along the horizon-
tal dimension from the ECOSOC norm toward specialist classic is the UNFCCC. 
In most respects, the UNFCCC accreditation system follows that of ECOSOC. 
But in an effort to enhance administrability, the organization has developed a set 
of categories that differentiate between different kinds of NGOs. These catego-
ries include “research and independent NGOs (‘RINGOs’), business and indus-
try NGOs (‘BINGOs’), environmental NGOs (‘ENGOs’), local NGOs, indige-
nous peoples organizations (‘IPOs’), local government and municipal 
authorities (‘LGMAs’), islanders, trade unions, and faith-based groups.”
308
 The 
categories do not affect the amount of access a particular organization receives 
when accredited, but are rather designed to help organizations coordinate with 
each other and help the UNFCCC communicate in a coordinated fashion with 
them. 
The UNFCCC’s access structure falls somewhere between moderate classic 
and specialist classic along the horizontal spectrum. The UNFCCC maintains 
the fundamental distinction that ECOSOC introduced between for-proﬁt and 
nonproﬁt entities, accepting only the latter for accreditation. That is, all accred-
ited organizations must be NGOs, even though the rules recognize that different 
NGOs will have different constituencies. Moreover, even though the UNFCCC 
separates constituencies into different tracks, it does not regulate access differ-
ently for different groups, unlike the WHO and the FAO, which endeavor to 
separate private-sector inﬂuences from the rest and manage that private-sector 
 
/i3444e.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7HK-A8KR] (“The private sector includes enterprises, com-
panies or businesses, regardless of size, ownership and structure.”). The 2000 guidelines were 
renewed in 2015. See Progress Report on FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector 4 
(2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-mr854e.pdf [http://perma.cc/XW2X-Y3CW]. 
306. Private Sector, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org 
/partnerships/private-sector/en [http://perma.cc/5DMN-QTVT]. 
307. FAO Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector, supra note 305, at 18. The FAO Strategy for 
Partnerships with the Private Sector describes the main areas and types of engagement between 
the FAO and private-sector entities, including “development and implementation of technical 
programmes, policy dialogue, norms and standard setting, advocacy and communication, 
knowledge management and dissemination, and mobilization of resources.” Id. at 4; see also 
id. at 18 (noting that most collaborations and all private-sector partnerships must be governed 
by a written agreement that formalizes the terms of agreement, typically involving memo-
randa of understanding, “Partnership Agreements,” or “Exchange of Letters”). 
308. Tully, supra note 153, at 16. 
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relationship on separate and more restrictive terms. The UNFCCC is also a “clas-
sic” organization like all of the organizations so far examined in this Section be-
cause of the limited impact organizations are permitted to assert over the deci-
sion-making process. 
3. Outliers Exist 
A minority of organizations diverge from the well-trod path between mod-
erate and specialist classic regulatory formats. 
One outlier classic organization is the IMF. The consultation structure lands 
on the “generalist” end of the horizontal spectrum because, unlike in other UN 
agencies and bodies, there appears to be no speciﬁc set of criteria that must be 
followed in selecting nonstate actors that may engage. In fact, the IMF does not 
have a formal accreditation process through which it structures its relationships 
with nonstate actors. Instead, IMF engagement takes a variety of informal and 
formal forms at the global and country levels. The IMF broadly deﬁnes CSOs  to 
include:  
[N]ongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business forums, faith-
based organizations, labor unions and professional organizations, local 
community groups, philanthropic and charitable organizations, gender 
and women’s associations, local organizations of persons with disabili-
ties, social movements (including representatives of the informal sector 
and rural areas), academics, research centers and think tanks.
309
  
Rather than have a concrete accreditation procedure with set admission criteria, 
IMF staff are simply cautioned that it is a best practice to “[c]onduct[] due dili-
gence on the legitimacy of the selected CSO” in order “to ensure proper repre-
sentation within the country and avoid interaction with politically motivated or-
ganizations.”
310
 
The IMF is also far toward the top “classic” end of the vertical spectrum be-
cause, in marked contrast to the equal membership of state and nonstate entities 
at the International Labour Organization (ILO), discussed below, the IMF’s 
 
309. 2015 Guidelines on the IMF Staff Engagement with Civil Society Organizations, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND 2 n.2 [hereinafter IMF CSO Guidelines], http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/pdf
/CSOGuidelinesMarch2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/7JHL-2PGT]. CSOs can focus on a partic-
ular country or region or “have a global operation.” Id. 
310. Id. at 6 (directing staff to use internal resources such as regional and technical offices as well 
as drawing on the IMF Communication Department’s CSO database). 
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methods of engagement with nonstate entities are classically hierarchical. Non-
state actors have a variety of points of contact with IMF policymakers, but no 
decision-making authority. These points of contact can include meetings and fo-
rums; public consultations on the IMF’s policy and strategy papers; meetings 
and seminars with IMF staff and executive directors on speciﬁc policy or country 
issues; invitations by the IMF to contribute to review of the IMF’s policies at 
seminars or on its external website; and a “Civil Society Policy Forum” held 
jointly with meetings of the IMF and World Bank.
311
 
In a process somewhat analogous to the notice-and-comment process in the 
United States, a key way that CSOs can engage with the IMF is through public 
and private consultations.
312
 The public consultation process is “an open call for 
feedback from CSOs, and interested stakeholders” that runs for approximately 
six to eight weeks.
313
 Interested CSOs and stakeholders submit comments that 
become part of the official record through an online platform, phone confer-
ences, or emails.
314
 IMF departments sometimes conduct a “road-show” during 
the public consultation period to help ensure that CSOs and other key stake-
holders understand the issue and to receive their direct feedback.
315
 At the end 
of the public consultation, all comments received are made public on the online 
platform.
316
 Public consultations have taken place on issues including, for exam-
ple, ﬁnancial-sector taxation, low-income countries’ facilities review, and natural 
 
311. Factsheet: The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 2017), http://
www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-and-Civil-Society-Organizations?pdf=1 [http://
perma.cc/9JS5-SQHF]. Importantly, many of the sessions covered at the Civil Society Policy 
Forum are organized by the CSOs. The Policy Forum also includes a Fellowship Program for 
CSOs that was initiated by the IMF in 2003 to increase diversity in CSO attendance. The 
program sponsors twenty to forty CSO fellows, mainly from developing countries and emerg-
ing market economies, to participate in the meetings. See IMF CSO Guidelines, supra note 309, 
at 12-13. At the country level, engagement with CSOs is also undertaken in a variety of differ-
ent forms. Generally, IMF staff are encouraged to engage with CSOs during the three major 
phases of IMF in-country mission work—i.e., pre-mission, on-mission, and post-mission 
phases—in order to seek consultation on program design and implementation. Id. at 9-12. 
IMF staff engagement with CSOs ranges from “in-depth one-on-one meetings” to “group 
meetings” with representatives from a number of CSOs. Id. at 10. 
312. IMF CSO Guidelines, supra note 309, at 14-15. 
313. Id. at 15-16. 
314. Id. at 16. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 17. 
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resources.
317
 The IMF also engages with CSOs by inviting participation in tar-
geted and closed consultations for more sensitive or complex policy issues.
318
 
These private consultations can take the form of “off-the-record meetings or 
conference calls” and are often organized to seek initial CSO input to inform the 
IMF’s thinking prior to opening up the consultation to a wider set of CSOs.
319
 
This process again parallels U.S. administrative-law practice in the period prior 
to notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
In short, the IMF has adopted a consultation model closest to that of the U.S. 
administrative notice-and-comment procedure because it actively seeks input 
from a broad cross-section of nonstate actors without imposing categorical con-
straints such as requiring nonproﬁt status. Nevertheless, the model welcomes 
consultation rather than participation in that it does not entitle the nonstate actors 
to engage in any decision-making capacity. 
A second outlier is the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), which falls somewhere toward the exact center of the lob-
bying rules map on both horizontal and vertical spectra. On the vertical spec-
trum, UNCITRAL falls between the ILO and IMF (between classic and innova-
tor) because nonstate actors can signiﬁcantly affect the organization’s decisional 
processes, but participation by nonstate actors falls short of full membership, as 
the ILO affords. This is because nonstate actors are in practice able to participate 
in the consensus required for UNCITRAL’s adoption of legal rules, even though 
those nonstate actors do not possess de jure voting rights. On the horizontal 
spectrum, UNCITRAL also falls toward the middle because it does not permit 
all entrants to access its meetings and consensus-forming procedures (unlike the 
IMF), but exercises some control over which entities are entitled to participate in 
the work of the Commission (like ECOSOC).
320
 
Because this organization’s relationship with nonstate actors is somewhat 
unique, it merits a more sustained analysis. First, UNCITRAL’s work helps ex-
plain its unique relationship with nonstate actors: it focuses on the international 
trade law that governs the relationship between private parties, developing rules 
related to international contracting, payments, insolvency, secured transactions, 
sale of goods, and so forth. The organization is composed of sixty member states 
elected by the General Assembly for six-year terms and carries out its agenda-
 
317. Id. at 14. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. Often, the policy issues considered require “consensus building at the membership level, 
or . . . have a complex preparation process.” Id. at 15. 
320. Id. at 15.  
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setting work at annual sessions, with more frequent working groups on partic-
ular subjects.
321
 Working groups draft the legal instruments in particular subject 
areas
322
 and are assisted by preparatory work developed by the UNCITRAL sec-
retariat in consultation with experts.
323
 Notably, UNCITRAL develops draft in-
struments that states may later choose to adopt, including conventions, model 
laws, legislative guides, and model provisions.
324
 The fact that many of the 
norms UNCITRAL produces are both nonbinding
325
 and of very keen interest 
to nonstate actors helps explain why nonstate actors have been afforded more 
extensive participatory rights than is normal for other organizations. 
Second, UNCITRAL is very open to outside observers. Both nonmember 
states and nonstate actors are called “observers,” and the deliberation process is 
open to both.
326
 UNCITRAL “maintains mailing lists of organizations whose 
expertise is relevant to issues addressed by the various working groups” and will 
send invitation letters to various organizations to request expertise for a partic-
ular working group meeting or general meetings.
327
 Organizations may be 
placed on the mailing lists at their own request, provided the Secretariat and the 
member states approve the request.
328
 UNCITRAL will continue to send invita-
tions to particular organizations “so long as their work remains relevant.”
329
 Ob-
servers may circulate documents to working groups, and have the same rights as 
member states to make statements and respond to proposals.
330
 In short, these 
observers (both nonmember states and nonstate entities) share the access rights 
of the member-state participants on equal terms. 
 
321. See FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INT’L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html [http://perma
.cc/XZ6F-GXSD]; see also Kelly, supra note 16, at 108. 
322. Id. In 2005, the six working groups addressed subjects such as arbitration, insolvency law, and 
electronic commerce. The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law, UNITED NATIONS 5 n.12 (2007), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf 
/english/texts/general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/7H5K-84CQ]. 
323. Kelly, supra note 16, at 108. 
324. The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, supra note 322, at 13-17 (reviewing UNCITRAL’s use of these various legislative tech-
niques). 
325. See id. Although UNCITRAL at times produces draft treaties that become binding when states 
sign and ratify them, it also produces model legislation and legislative guides and recommen-
dations, none of which are binding on member states. Id. 
326. Kelly, supra note 16, at 111 & n.39 (“UNCITRAL . . . prides itself on its openness.”). 
327. Id. at 111 n.40. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 112 n.42. 
the yale law journal 127:1742  2018 
1816 
Third, UNCITRAL has developed unusual consensus voting rules. Rather 
than being established as an organ or agency of the UN (like ECOSOC, the 
WHO, and the IMF) or a treaty body (like the UNFCCC), UNCITRAL was 
established by the General Assembly
331
 and has declared that the General As-
sembly’s Rules of Procedure will apply where appropriate, as UNCITRAL itself 
has no distinct rules of procedure.
332
 Largely, however, UNCITRAL has devel-
oped its own idiosyncratic and nonformalized working methods. Under these 
methods, both the working groups and the Commission act by consensus rather 
than by voting. But consensus does not mean unanimity. Rather, it is something 
closer to a “substantially prevailing view”
333
 that does not allow a veto by any 
individual state.
334
 As UNCITRAL’s literature explains, “[t]he basis of consen-
sus is that efforts are made to address all concerns raised so that the ﬁnal text is 
acceptable to all.”
335
 This decisional structure is particularly important because, 
as Claire Kelly has recently noted, nonstate observers can shape the consensus 
process and thus have inﬂuence akin to voting rights.
336
 
The openness of UNCITRAL’s working methods to nonstate actors—com-
bined with the consensus voting mechanism—produced a controversy between 
UNCITRAL member states that reveals the depth of inﬂuence held by nonstate 
observers. In 2007, France challenged current practices and called for a review of 
the meaning of consensus and the level of nonmember participation. France 
noted that the “NGOs play a major role because of the expertise they possess in 
the areas under discussion.”
337
 In particular, France observed that when UN-
CITRAL seeks to draft a new legal instrument, it is the nonstate experts and the 
groups that they represent that initiate the process and provide much of the tech-
nical expertise. These groups are neither representatives nor delegates of any 
member and they operate without any guidelines. France also noted the rise of 
 
331. G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI) (Dec. 17, 1966). UNCITRAL was established in 1966 for the purpose 
of reducing disparities in national laws governing international trade by harmonizing and 
unifying those laws. Id. at 99. 
332. Kelly, supra note 16, at 106-07. 
333. Id. at 111 (citation omitted). 
334. Id. at 110-11. 
335. FAQ—Methods of Work, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., http://www 
.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html [http://perma.cc/R3CG-6QWC]. 
336. Kelly, supra note 16, at 111-12. Kelly’s analysis is based on documentation of a dispute between 
UNCITRAL member states in which France was concerned that the robust participation of 
nonstate observers served to dilute nation-state inﬂuence over the proceedings. See id. at 113-
20. 
337. Id. at 114 (quoting France’s Observations on UNCITRAL’s Working Methods, ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/635 (May 24, 2007)). 
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NGO inﬂuence, observing that in the past there were only a small number of 
NGOs active within UNCITRAL, whereas now the number has expanded 
greatly, with a substantial effect on the ultimate UNCITRAL work product.
338
 
Highlighting the uniqueness of UNCITRAL’s relationship with nonstate ac-
tors, one of France’s complaints was that nonstate actor participation exceeds 
that permitted by ECOSOC’s Resolution 1996/31, which it claimed provides the 
“general framework” for NGO activities that UNCITRAL should follow.
339
 
Moreover, France complained that these nonstate entities are not properly 
NGOs, but rather should be called “non-state entities” or “professional associa-
tions.”
340
 Finally, France objected to the fact that distinctions between member 
states and observers have frequently been blurred, in part because observers are 
permitted to circulate working documents on their own initiative and are able to 
speak at any time during the process.
341
 Notably, France alleged and the Secre-
tariat “readily admit[ted]” that this collapsing of distinctions allows nonstate 
entities outsized inﬂuence because of the consensus decision-making procedure, 
since it is unclear when the speakers are true members and when they are ob-
servers.
342
 Without a vote, more input by nonstate entities readily inﬂuences the 
sense of a room with respect to whether consensus has been achieved. 
France sought to limit the inﬂuence of these entities by moving UN-
CITRAL’s access rules up the vertical spectrum, to use this Article’s framework. 
France sought more of a classic structure, as it advocated for a process whereby 
the working groups may determine who will attend their meetings and shut out 
the nonstate entities when they so choose. France also sought to move toward 
the right of the horizontal spectrum toward the specialist end by establishing an 
accreditation mechanism for NGOs, with separate categories for entities with 
general expertise and more speciﬁc expertise. The accreditation process would 
also specify the participatory rights of these organizations and limit their rights 
to contribute to the formation or blocking of consensus. In sum, France’s objec-
tions demonstrate concerns both about administrability and about the relative 
status of nonstate entities in relation to state entities; they sought to preserve the 
sovereign right of states to exert control over the international lawmaking pro-
cess. 
 
338. Kelly, supra note 16, at 115. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. at 116. 
342. Id. 
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4. The New Multistakeholder Institutions Are Specialist Innovators 
While the spectrum of organizations along the horizontal classic dimension 
is well-populated based on the ECOSOC model, a cluster of specialist innovators 
have different origin stories. This corner of the rules map is becoming increas-
ingly populated. For example, the ILO has a very unusual access structure in 
which “labour unions and businesses are formal participants in the ILO’s work 
and deliberative processes.”
343
 The ILO’s structure is known as “tripartite”—la-
bor unions, businesses, and nation-states operate as participants on equal terms. 
This structure makes the ILO unusual among international organizations,
344
 
particularly since the ILO is not a contemporary innovator, but rather an early, 
pre-World War II institution, founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles 
that ended World War I.
345
 The ILO is a specialist in our analysis because it di-
vides the private sector from other nonstate actors—in this instance labor un-
ions—and gives each a distinct status. It is an innovator in that nonstate actors 
are full members. 
A much more modern outlier in the same “specialist innovator” quadrant as 
the ILO is UN Women. This organization serves as an exemplar of a very recent 
trend: in the last ten to ﬁfteen years before this writing, a number of organiza-
tions have adopted innovative structures offering nonstate actors robust mem-
bership rights. For many years, the ILO would have been the only organization 
in this quadrant; now a number of organizations crowd the ﬁeld. UN Women 
was established in July 2010 by a General Assembly resolution,
346
 which 
“[r]ecognizes that civil society organizations, in particular women’s organiza-
tions, play a vital role in promoting women’s rights, gender equality and the em-
powerment of women;”
347
 and, in a phrasing reminiscent of the ECOSOC norm, 
“[r]equests the head of [UN Women] to continue the existing practice of effec-
tive consultation with civil society organizations, and encourages their meaning-
ful contribution to the work of [UN Women].”
348
 UN Women has since devel-
oped three primary ways for civil society to participate in developing its 
strategies, programs, and policies. 
 
343. Raustiala, supra note 48, at 158. 
344. Structure, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are [http://
perma.cc/BX5K-QBYJ]. 
345. Origins and History, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history [http://
perma.cc/WG3Y-U5VE]. 
346. G.A. Res. 64/289, ¶ 49 (July 21, 2010). 
347. Id. at ¶ 54. 
348. Id. at ¶ 55. 
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First, UN Women’s executive board may invite NGOs in consultative status 
with ECOSOC to participate in its deliberations.
349
 Second, individuals and 
groups may join “Civil Society Advisory Groups” (CSAGs), which are talk shops 
formed at national, multi-state, regional, and global levels
350
 to engage civil so-
ciety.
351
 CSAG applicants may be members of academia, women’s and grassroots 
communities, gender equality networks, and development or social policy think 
tanks.
352
 It is preferred that they have “strong credentials as gender, development 
and/or human rights advocates.”
353
 There is no provision in the CSAG guiding 
principles that excludes individuals and organizations associated with business 
interests, so they presumably may be accepted if they are otherwise eligible.  
So far, these modes of access are rather standard. The third point of access 
between the organization and nonstate actors is the one that moves UN Women 
to the bottom of the vertical spectrum into the “innovator” category. In 2014, UN 
Women created a Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, which grants 
membership to nonstate groups upon invitation of the UN Women executive 
board. The focus of the Council is to “accelerate economic and social progress for 
 
349. The UN-Women Executive Board: An Informal Guide, UN WOMEN 9 (Feb. 2015), http://
www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/executive%20board
/un%20women%20executive%20board%20informal%20guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4EW 
-LAKY]. 
350. Civil Society Advisory Groups, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/civil 
-society/civil-society-advisory-groups [http://perma.cc/5ZU7-AP68] (including a list of six 
regional CSAGs, twenty-nine national CSAGs, two multicountry CSAGs, and one global 
CSAG). 
351. Guiding Principles: UN Women’s Civil Society Advisory Groups, UN WOMEN 1, http://www 
.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/partnerships/civil%20society
/guiding_principles_civil_society_advisory_groups.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3YQ-LXP8] 
(explaining that CSAGs “build on existing close relationships and increase strategic dialogue 
with civil society partners at global, regional and national levels and . . . formally recognize 
civil society as one of our most important constituencies”). For membership in a CSAG, an 
individual must be nominated, elected, or selected in a manner determined through consul-
tation with “civil society networks/organizations in accordance with practices well-suited to 
local and national contexts” with a focus on achieving “balanced and diverse membership.” Id. 
at 1-2. 
352. Id. at 2. 
353. Id. The membership list for the global CSAG is published on the UN Women website; how-
ever, membership lists for the regional, national, and multicountry CSAGs are published in-
consistently on regional UN Women website pages. See, e.g., UN Women Asia Paciﬁc Regional 
Civil Society Advisory Group, UN WOMEN, http://asiapaciﬁc.unwomen.org/en/about-us/civil 
-society-advisory-group [http://perma.cc/7KT2-TFGB]. CSAGs are also granted access to a 
web-based platform to facilitate communication among themselves. Civil Society Advisory 
Groups, supra note 350. 
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women and girls worldwide by combining our expertise, reach and re-
sources”;
354
 indeed, as far as resources go, these businesses are major ﬁnancial 
contributors to UN Women.
355
 There are ten founding corporate leaders on the 
Council, including chief executives of The Coca-Cola Company, L’Oréal, Gold-
man Sachs, and Unilever.
356
 The Council meets twice per year to review progress 
and provide strategic input to guide advocacy and resource mobilization efforts. 
It is unclear what, if any, additional access rights to UN Women membership in 
the Council secures. It is expected that each of the corporate-sector members will 
“deepen their engagement with UN Women through partnership agreements in 
support of the organization’s priorities.”
357
 They may also sign onto the Women’s 
Empowerment Principles, which offer guidance to businesses on how to support 
women in the workplace, marketplace, and community.
358
  
Other specialist innovators that similarly trade policy making and oversight 
rights for ﬁnancial support are the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
359
 
*** 
In sum, the lobbying rules map describes a number of ideal types, but or-
ganizations instantiate those types in unique ways. Nevertheless, the common 
features the typology identiﬁes are useful in evaluating tradeoffs each basic type 
makes between administrability and balancing nonstate inputs, between pre-
serving state sovereignty and capturing robust nonstate expertise and engage-
ment, and between openness and selectiveness. These tradeoffs give rise to the 
larger prescriptive hypotheses in the Section that follows. 
 
354. UN Women Launches Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, UN WOMEN (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2014/6/private-sector-leadership-advisory 
-council-launched [http://perma.cc/T6GL-UGSR]. 
355. See, e.g., Annual Report 2015-2016, UN WOMEN 47 (2016), http://www2.unwomen.org 
/-/media/annual%20report/attachments/sections/library/un-women-annual-report-2015 
-2016-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6ZH-W4CK] (showing that The Coca Cola Company con-
tributed $310,000 in 2015-16 and that other companies not on the board also contributed, 
such as MasterCard, which contributed $500,000); see also id. at 41 (explaining that $20 mil-
lion will be pledged by foundations and corporations to fund gender equality and women’s 
empowerment). 
356. UN Women Launches Private Sector Leadership Advisory Council, supra note 354. 
357. UN Women’s Major Partners, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships
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B. Payoffs and Open Questions 
The lobbying rules typology offers a conceptual structure to organize the Ar-
ticle’s main claims. The following discussion reviews those claims and proposes 
potential prescriptive consequences. Most signiﬁcantly, I argue that reforms 
should likely occupy the far top left and bottom right corners of the lobbying 
rules map. 
First, a brief summative review: Framing the current access rules as lobbying 
regulation allows reformers to borrow from the toolbox of domestic regulations 
in the United States and elsewhere, as well as frameworks for reform developed 
by international bodies like the OECD. It also marries and cross-pollinates two 
diverse scholarly traditions: 1) the highly optimistic tradition that imagines non-
state actors as legitimacy-conferring representatives of global publics, positing 
that those publics can democratize international organizations and thereby en-
large their mandates;
360
 and 2) the highly pessimistic strand that decries lobby-
ing as a “most serious and worrisome problem”
361
 and “a corruption of the dem-
ocratic process,”
362
 which even the most globally advanced lobbying regulator 
fails to adequately control. 
This Part, to this point, has illustrated that access by nonstate actors to in-
ternational organizations is usually more akin to lobbying than it is to democratic 
voting, as the strong legitimacy-optimist position imagines. Not only are pri-
vate-sector lobbying groups like trade and industry associations registered as 
“consultants” or “observers” to a wide variety of institutions, but the access they 
are afforded can be analogized to lobbying access, since the majority of the inter-
national structures cluster to the “classic” end of the vertical spectrum, affording 
full decisional power to nation-states and various forms of controlled access and 
input opportunities to nonstate actors. At the same time, some innovator organ-
izations have begun to offer more robust forms of access to private actors in ex-
change for various resources those private actors can offer, like ﬁnancial re-
sources (e.g., UN Women and GAVI); access to affected populations 
(UNAIDS); or support or voluntary compliance by private-sector actors (UN-
CITRAL and UN Women). 
Based on this analysis, I suggest the following prescriptive proposal: reforms 
should push regulatory structures diagonally into opposite corners of the rules 
map. That is, reforms should produce structures that fall into the generalist clas-
sic or specialist innovator categories, as shown in Table 3: 
 
360. See, e.g., Cardoso Report, supra note 4, at 24, 30. 
361. Cohen-Eliya & Hammer, supra note 71, at 265. 
362. McKinley, supra note 2, at 1158. 
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TABLE 3. 
 Less Categorical  More Categorical 
Access Generalist Classic Moderate Classic Specialist Classic 
Participation    
Membership Generalist Innovator Moderate Innovator Specialist Innovator 
 
To start with the simplest part of this prescription, organizations should gen-
erally stay away from the generalist innovator category. The category appears to 
be a null set among current international organizations and it is unlikely that any 
organizations should adopt structures in this category in the future. The reason 
is that a generalist innovator’s access rules would give full membership rights to 
all potential entrants, of whatever interest or type. That is, individuals, NGOs, 
trade and industry associations, business entities, and others would all have the 
capacity to participate in the development of international rules through voting 
rights or other recognized decision-making capacity. Not only would this be a 
radical step under international law—dispensing with state sovereignty alto-
gether and putting lawmaking power in the hands of individuals and sub-state 
entities—it is hard to envision how an international organization could admin-
ister such a pluralist voting structure. 
Next, why should more classic organizations move to the left along the hor-
izontal spectrum? As this Article has shown, the tendency over time has in fact 
been in the opposite direction: organizations have moved rightward across the 
horizontal spectrum from generalist to specialist, with many access rules cluster-
ing toward the center of that spectrum. But this shift has been motivated at least 
in part by strong legitimacy optimism, as lawmakers try to admit NGOs that 
would help those organizations claim the legitimacy of the “global public.” In 
service of this end, organizations have needed to be able to claim that those 
NGOs were representative of their members, that the groups represented a bal-
ance of individuals from the global north and south, and that their leaders an-
swered to the members.
363
 So organizations have implemented reforms that 
erect more distinctions between different kinds of groups (they have become 
more specialist) in an effort to carry out this strong legitimacy-optimist agenda. 
The recent reform at the WHO is a prime example of this: the WHO wishes to 
 
363. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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distinguish between public-interest and private-sector groups in order to regu-
late each separately. 
The argument I have made in this Article is that this move toward more spe-
cialist organizations is ill-advised and likely will not produce the intended re-
sults. Literature examining the ECOSOC rules shows that it is difficult to deter-
mine whether a consultant group speaks for its members and to maintain a 
balance of voices from the global north and south. Here and in previous work I 
have built on that critique by suggesting that the presence of a signiﬁcant pri-
vate-sector lobby makes it even more difficult for international organizations to 
determine what interests an association represents. In particular, I have de-
scribed an “astroturf activism” phenomenon, where business entities “gain access 
to international lawmakers through front groups that obscure the identity of the 
proﬁt-seeking enterprise that is really the relevant actor.”
364
 Business organiza-
tions do this by capturing existing NGOs, forming their own,
365
 or capturing 
trade associations that purport to speak on behalf of a particular group of ac-
tors—such as an organization that purports to speak for farmers in the global 
south.
366
 Moreover, sometimes for-proﬁt entities can escape the notice of gate-
keepers and become accredited, notwithstanding their noncompliance with ac-
creditation eligibility rules. Indeed, the nonproﬁt criterion itself is domestically 
administered, and domestic administration is notably uneven.
367
 
In short, here and elsewhere, I argue that erecting yet more categorical dis-
tinctions between different nonstate entities for the purpose of enhancing rep-
resentation is a futile game because trying to reduce or eschew certain actors, like 
private-sector actors, can provoke capture of NGOs, mission distortion, and cov-
ert behavior. Experience has shown that separately regulating different entities 
does not appear to produce the representative participation those reforms 
seek.
368
 Thus, moving a set of access rules toward the right-hand “specialist” 
category, by adding additional categorical distinctions, will likely further sacri-
ﬁce administrability. The WHO reform is a particularly striking example of this, 
as the WHO itself is charged with reviewing applicant associations to inde-
pendently assess whether there might be any potential private-sector inﬂuences 
lurking that could potentially cause undue inﬂuence over WHO officials and 
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Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1030-31 (2011). 
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the yale law journal 127:1742  2018 
1824 
state delegates.
369
 This imposes a heavy burden on those institutional gatekeep-
ers to ferret out the kinds of astroturf activism the private sector will be most 
eager to hide; it may also chill productive partnerships between public-interest 
and private-sector groups. 
Thus, the lobbying frame presents a set of tradeoffs. Officials can either (1) 
recognize the “consultation” procedure as lobbying, embrace the “generalist clas-
sic” model in which they get out of the business of policing the representative-
ness of NGOs, and use lobbying regulatory tools like disclosure and transpar-
ency as constraints; or (2) build truly participatory multistakeholder structures 
that permit a smaller number of hand-selected representatives to participate as 
policymakers and members, crafting new “specialist innovator” models such as 
those seen in the new global health context (e.g., GAVI, the Global Fund, UN-
AIDS). 
The former strategy would improve administrability. Reforms would extri-
cate admission criteria meant to enhance representativeness and accountability 
and borrow domestic regulatory strategies focusing on registration and publicly 
available disclosure of lobbying activities. Organizations would stop policing 
motives and accountability and instead put all entrants on an equal playing ﬁeld. 
Lawmakers would be charged with assessing the value of the input on its own 
terms for the expertise or other functional value of the input, rather than as a 
quasi-vote on a particular legal rule delivered by an unaccountable representative 
of an imagined global constituency. 
The latter strategy—moving to specialist innovator organizations—would 
also improve administrability, but instead by radically decreasing the number of 
representatives who are permitted to participate. It would move away from the 
chimeric, imagined participation of the consultation process to true participa-
tion, where nonstate organizations have a voting stake in the work of the inter-
national institution. This actual stake could encourage consolidation of views 
among particular kinds of stakeholders. This structure would not likely be the 
right choice for all international organizations, but it could be a promising re-
form for some, particularly in areas where collaboration with private-sector en-
tities is likely to produce better, more effective, or more broadly accepted legal 
rules. Which strategy will be most successful for a given organization will de-
pend on how well those nonstate collaborations will help the organization carry 
out its mission. 
Indeed, one might imagine plotting types of international organizations on a 
third spectrum and transforming the map into a cube. This could allow predic-
tions about where on the lobbying rules map a particular organization’s rules 
ought to land, based on the distinctive needs of that organization. Organizations 
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that draw substantially on private-sector assistance—for expertise, voluntary 
compliance, or ﬁnancial support—may be more likely to beneﬁt from access rules 
in the specialist innovator space. Organizations that require substantial support 
and buy-in from national governments may be best advised to maintain “classic” 
structures that preserve nation-state sovereignty over the relevant issues. Organ-
izations like UNCITRAL may fall in the middle because they are caught in a 
bind: On the one hand, they need state support in order to obtain implementa-
tion in national jurisdictions of the rules they produce. On the other hand, they 
beneﬁt from private-sector expertise and will need private-sector buy-in as well, 
or national jurisdictions will have trouble overcoming objections at home when 
they seek to implement the rules they have developed at the international level. 
Perhaps it is these factors which explain both UNCITRAL’s location in the center 
of the rules map and the controversy its access rules have produced. Other or-
ganizations, like UNAIDS, have decided that it is important to give a full voting 
stake to NGOs that work with populations affected by the AIDS virus. Future 
efforts regarding cybersecurity, which will depend heavily on private-sector ex-
pertise, might also be excellent candidates for such an approach. 
conclusion 
With change comes opportunity. The early twenty-ﬁrst-century global con-
text poses existential threats to fundamental principles of the post-World War II 
order, such as the value of multilateralism, the primacy of diplomacy over mili-
tary force, and the neoliberal promise of free trade. But uncertainty and change 
also present fertile opportunities to transform key features of the current order. 
One important feature of the changing global landscape is the relationship 
between nation-states and nonstate actors. Business entities have become their 
own global powers, rivaling nations in their economic and political clout. While 
proﬁt motives can distort and thwart international lawmaking intended to serve 
the public good, nations and international organizations also depend on business 
entities for expertise, innovation, and cooperation. How should international 
law respond to these facts? This Article addresses one key facet of this question. 
The theory of this Article is that reframing the international accreditation 
structures as a body of international lobbying law focuses reforms on means to 
capture the important informational and practical contributions of all nonstate 
participants—whether they be classic public-beneﬁt NGOs, industry or trade as-
sociations, business entities, or others—while introducing sunlight into the pro-
cess through more functional registration and disclosure rules. 
At the same time, by framing these contributions as lobbying, not participa-
tion, the theory clears away misleading assumptions that have insidiously 
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thwarted deeper reforms. The lobbying framework reveals that the current in-
ternational access laws preserve a clear hierarchy between national sovereigns 
and nonstate entities. New multistakeholder institutions offer promising models 
for areas like cybersecurity, climate change, and global health, where productive 
public-private collaboration may be critical to addressing global challenges. 
 
